



International Report 1H 2016



International Report

We report the number of demands we received in the first half of 2016 from law enforcement for customer information in each country outside the U.S. in which we do business (and had such demands) that does not legally prohibit us from reporting such information. The table below presents the number of demands we received in the first half of 2016; following that number, in parenthesis, is the number of customer selectors at issue in those demands.

A few notes about the table. A customer selector is an information point, such as a telephone number or IP address, used to identify a customer. Our initial reports only included the number of customer selectors; since, we have also been presenting the number of demands we have received. To provide more detail, we have divided the number of demands in the chart below into two categories. A demand for subscriber information typically requires that we provide the name and address of a customer assigned a given phone number or IP address. A demand for transactional information may, for instance, seek a log of numbers called.

We also report the number of lawful demands for intercepts (and the number of customer selectors at issue in those demands) that we received in Germany, the only country, other than the United States, in which we received demands to intercept content and are not precluded from reporting.

Finally, as explained in the notes accompanying the table, there are some limits to what we can disclose regarding law enforcement demands.

Demands for customer data (Outside of the United States)

	Half of 2013*	1 st Half of 2014	2 nd Half of 2014	1 st Half of 2015	2 nd Half of 2015	1 st Half of 2016
		Customer Selectors in Demands	Number of Demands (Number of Customer Selectors in those Demands)	Number of Demands (Number of Customer Selectors in those Demands)	Number of Demands (Number of Customer Selectors in those Demands)	Number of Demands (Number of Customer Selectors in those Demands)



Country		For Subscriber Information	For Transactional Information								
Australia ¹	14.5	23	0	23(23)	0	8(8)	1(1)	17(17)	1(1)	20(20)	0
Austria	4	0	0	4(4)	0	1(1)	0	1(1)	0	2(2)	0
Belgium	236.5	362	0	173(193)	0	144(165)	4(4)	123(193)	0	168(233)	0
Canada	0	2	0	0	0	4(4)	0	0	0	0	0
France	637.5	745	17	465(639)	0	462(608)	0	462(543)	0	521(616)	0
Germany ²	1498	1	669	5(5)	224(325)	1(1)	181(300)	3(3)	251(347)	15(15)	422(426)
Hong Kong	0	0	0	1(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



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UK	19 3	168	9	146(1 73)	2(2)	145(1 63)	4(4)	94(11 1)	7(9)	43(46)	10(16)

NOTES:

* In our first Transparency Report (published in January 2014), we reported on the full year for 2013. Since that Report, we have reported data based on half-year periods. To aid the comparison between the half-year numbers we have reported since 2013 and the full-year numbers we reported in 2013, we have simply halved the 2013 numbers in the table.

1. In Australia we are precluded by law from reporting the number of warrants we received from law enforcement for interceptions or stored communications. As such, for Australia, we provide only the numbers of demands for subscriber information and transactional information.

2. In Germany, in addition to legal demands for subscriber information and transactional information, we received demands for lawful intercepts. In the first half of 2016, we received 1,756 such demands regarding 1,822 customer selectors. All of these demands were for the interception of calls initiated in Germany and made to specified international numbers. We did not receive demands for interceptions from any other European country.

3. In India we are precluded by law from discussing any information about the requests we might receive from the Government of India or identifying the specific number of websites that we were asked to block by the Government of India.

4. In the Netherlands the Central Information Point for Telecommunications (CIOT in Dutch) program run by the Ministry of Justice requires telecommunications providers to store all subscriber data (name, address, service provided, name of provider, telephone numbers, IP-addresses, and email-addresses) in a central database that is accessible to Dutch law enforcement. The information we report here does not include access by Dutch law enforcement to customer data that are stored in the CIOT database. The Dutch government provides its own report on law enforcement access to the information stored by all providers in the CIOT database: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/jaarverslagen/2016/02/03/ciot-jaarverslag-2015>.

No Extraterritorial Demands

Verizon provides cloud computing and data storage services to business customers around the world, including many non-U.S. customers in data centers outside the United States. In our prior reports, we advised that we had not received any demands from the United States government for data stored in other countries for the periods covered in those reports. Likewise, we did not receive any demands in the United States for data stored in other countries in the first half of 2016. Nor do we anticipate that we will



receive such a demand going forward. Indeed, on June 14, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed our long-held view that the U.S. government cannot use a warrant to obtain communications stored by our non-U.S. customers in our data centers outside the United States. Verizon had filed briefs in the case because it is important that our customers outside the United States have confidence that the U.S. government cannot compel Verizon to turn over data stored in our overseas data centers. (The caption of the case is *In the Matter of a Warrant to Search Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation*, 14-2985).

Blocking Demands

On occasion, we are required by government orders, regulations or other legal requirements to block access to specified websites. To be clear, these are requests to block access to a website, not a request to remove user content; we did not receive a request from any government to remove user content last year. While we have not received blocking demands in the United States, we have received such demands in a handful of other countries. Generally, the blocking demands are issued because the websites are contrary to laws in those countries relating to child pornography, online gambling or copyright.

The figures below relate to the number of websites we were required to block access to during the relevant period of time. We may be required to block access in the specified country to such websites for an ongoing period of time but, except in Colombia, we count such demands only for the period in which they were initially made. For Colombia, because we are now provided with a running list of websites to block, we now report the total number of websites on the list at the end of the period. We were also required to block access to websites in India but are precluded by law from identifying the specific number of websites.

	Half of 2013*	1 st Half of 2014	2 nd Half of 2014	1 st Half of 2015	2nd Half of 2015	1st Half of 2016
Belgium	18.5	25	11	8	24	20
Colombia	600	1324	972	1,460	1,428	815
Greece	212	15	15	26	0	150



Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	251
Italy	0	2	3	0	0	0
Portugal	1	17	36	74	28	0
Russian Federation	0	0	66	7	3	0

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