

Verizon's Transparency Report for the 1st Half of 2020

Verizon's Transparency Report presents the number of demands we received from law enforcement in the United States and other countries in which we did business in the first half of 2020

International report

We report the number of demands we received in the first half of 2020 from law enforcement for customer information in each country outside the U.S. in which we do business (and had such demands) that does not legally prohibit us from reporting such information. The table below presents the number of demands we received in the first half of 2020; following that number, in parenthesis, is the number of customer selectors at issue in those demands. The table presents data for the past couple of years; data from prior periods can be found by clicking on the Archive tab at the top of the page.

A few notes about the table. A customer selector is an information point, such as a telephone number or IP address, used to identify a customer. Our initial reports only included the number of customer selectors; since, we have also been presenting the number of demands we have received. To provide more detail, we have divided the number of demands in the chart below into two categories. A demand for subscriber information typically requires that we provide the name and address of a customer assigned a given phone number or IP address. A demand for transactional information may, for instance, seek a log of numbers called.

We also report the number of lawful demands for intercepts (and the number of customer selectors at issue in those demands) that we received in Germany and the Netherlands, the only countries other than the United States, in which we received demands to intercept content and are not precluded from reporting.

Finally, as explained in the notes accompanying the table, there are some limits to what we can disclose regarding law enforcement demands.

Demands of customer data (outside of the United States)

**Number of Demands (Number of Customer Selectors in those Demands)*

Country	1H 2018 Subscriber Information	1H 2018 Transactional Information	2H 2018 Subscriber Information	2H 2018 Transactional Information	1H 2019 Subscriber Information	1H 2019 Transactional Information	2H 2019 Subscriber Information	2H 2019 Transactional Information	1H 2020 Transactional Information
Argentina	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia ¹	21(21)	5(5)	2(2)	5(5)	1(1)	4(4)	2(2)	6(6)	5(5)
Austria	0	0	2(2)	0	1(1)	0	2(2)	0	0
Belgium	254(389)	0	237(1491)	0	229(361)	0	279(418)	0	0
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	776(883)	24(24)	626(743)	13(14)	733(867)	17(17)	712(830)	35(35)	24(24)

Germany²	13(13)	549(549)	14(14)	435(435)	16(16)	575(575)	14(14)	712(712)	549(549)
Hong Kong	0	0	0	1(1)	1(1)	0	0	0	0
India³									
Italy	27(27)	18(18)	20(20)	0	14(14)	19(19)	20(20)	12(12)	18(18)
Japan	0	0	0	0	1(1)	0	0	0	0
Netherlands⁴	68(69)	0	24(24)	2(2)	59(59)	0	72(72)	0	0
Singapore	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	2(2)	0	0	0	0	0	2(2)	5(5)	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland	7(7)	0	2(2)	0	2(2)	0	9(9)	0	0
Taiwan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UK	10(10)	26(27)	30(42)	1(1)	23(27)	4(4)	39(43)	4(4)	26(27)

NOTES:

1. *In Australia we are precluded by law from reporting the number of warrants we received from law enforcement for interceptions or stored communications. As such, for Australia, we provide only the numbers of demands for subscriber information and transactional information.*
2. *In Germany, in addition to legal demands for subscriber information and transactional information, we received demands for lawful intercepts. In the first half of 2020, we received 1765 such demands regarding 1765 customer selectors. All of these demands were for the interception of calls initiated in Germany and made to specified international numbers.*
3. *In India we are precluded by law from discussing any information about the requests we might receive from the Government of India or identifying the specific number of websites that we were asked to block by the Government of India.*
4. *In the Netherlands the Central Information Point for Telecommunications (CIOT in Dutch) program run by the Ministry of Justice requires telecommunications providers to store all subscriber data (name, address, service provided, name of provider, telephone numbers, IP-addresses, and email-addresses) in a central database that is accessible to Dutch law enforcement. The information we report here does not include access by Dutch law enforcement to customer data that are stored in the CIOT database. The Dutch government provides its own report on law enforcement access to the information stored by all providers in the CIOT database: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/jaarverslagen/2019/06/18/jaarverslag-ciot-2018>. We also received 4 demands for lawful intercepts in the Netherlands during the first half of 2020.*

No extraterritorial demands

Verizon provides cloud computing and data storage services to business customers around the world, including many non-U.S. customers in data centers outside the United States. In our prior reports, we advised that we had not received any demands from the United States government for data stored in other countries for the periods covered in those reports. Likewise, we did not receive any demands from the United States government for data stored in other countries in the first half of 2020. Nor do we anticipate that we will receive such a demand going forward.

Blocking demands

On occasion, we are required by government orders, regulations or other legal requirements to block access to specified websites. To be clear, these are requests to block access to a website, not a request to remove user content; again, we did not receive a request from any government to remove user content in this reporting period. While we have not received blocking demands in the United States, we have received such demands in a handful of other countries. Generally, the blocking demands are issued because the websites are contrary to laws in those countries relating to child pornography, online gambling or copyright.

The figures below relate to the number of websites we were required to block access to during the relevant period of time. We may be required to block access in the specified country to such websites for an ongoing period of time but, except in Colombia, we count such demands only for the period in which they were initially made. For Colombia, because we are now provided with a running list of websites to block, we now report the total number of websites on the list at the end of the period. We were also required to block access to websites in India but are precluded by law from identifying the specific number of websites.

Country	1H 2017	2H 2017	1H 2018	2H 2018	1H 2019	2H 2019	1H 2020
Belgium	20	10	9	11	5	0	0
Colombia	2316	2371	2368	2611	2590	2464	2714
Greece	70	9	1064	684	3	23	1
Hungary	79	43	45	45	102	8	24
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland		1278	1100	2868	1552	1530	2575
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Russian Federation	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland						195	137