

Verizon's Transparency Report for the 2nd Half of 2020

Verizon's Transparency Report presents the number of demands we received from law enforcement in the United States and other countries where we did business during the second half of 2020

International Report

We report the number of demands for customer information that we received during the second half of 2020 from law enforcement in each country outside the U.S. where we did business (and had such demands) and where reporting such information is not legally prohibited. The table below presents the number of demands we received during the second half of 2020. Following that number, in parentheses, is the number of customer selectors at issue in those demands. The table presents data for the past couple of years. Data from prior periods can be found by clicking the "Archive" tab at the top of the page.

A few notes about the table. A customer selector is an information point, such as a telephone number or IP address, used to identify a given customer. While our initial Transparency Reports displayed only the number of customer selectors, we now also present the number of demands we received. To provide more detail, we have divided the number of demands in the table below into two categories. A demand for "subscriber information" typically requires that we provide the name and address of the customer assigned to a given phone number or IP address. A demand for "transactional information" may seek, for instance, a log of numbers called.

We also report the number of lawful demands for intercepts (and the number of customer selectors at issue in those demands) that we received from law enforcement in Germany and the Netherlands, which are the only countries other than the U.S. where we received demands to intercept content and where we are not precluded from reporting.

Finally, as explained in the notes accompanying the table, there are some limits to what we can disclose regarding law enforcement demands.

Demands for Customer Data (Outside of the United States)

**Number of Demands (Number of Customer Selectors in Those Demands)*

Country	2H 2018 Subscriber Information	2H 2018 Transactional Information	1H 2019 Subscriber Information	1H 2019 Transactional Information	2H 2019 Subscriber Information	2H 2019 Transactional Information	1H 2020 Transactional Information	2H 2020 Subscriber Information	2H 2020 Transactional Information
Argentina	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia ¹	2(2)	5(5)	1(1)	4(4)	2(2)	6(6)	5(5)	7(7)	0
Austria	2(2)	0	1(1)	0	2(2)	0	0	2(2)	0
Belgium	237(1491)	0	229(361)	0	279(418)	0	0	275(601)	0

Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	626(743)	13(14)	733(867)	17(17)	712(830)	35(35)	24(24)	712(823)	14(14)
Germany²	14(14)	435(435)	16(16)	575(575)	14(14)	712(712)	549(549)	57(57)	585(585)
Hong Kong	0	1(1)	1(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0
India³									
Italy	20(20)	0	14(14)	19(19)	20(20)	12(12)	18(18)	33(33)	26(26)
Japan	0	0	1(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands⁴	24(24)	2(2)	59(59)	0	72(72)	0	0	44(44)	0
Singapore	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0	2(2)	5(5)	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland	2(2)	0	2(2)	0	9(9)	0	0	3(3)	0
Taiwan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UK	30(42)	1(1)	23(27)	4(4)	39(43)	4(4)	26(27)	10(10)	0

NOTES:

1. In Australia, we are precluded by law from reporting the number of warrants we received from law enforcement for interceptions or stored communications. As such, for Australia, we provide only the numbers of demands for subscriber information and transactional information.
2. In Germany, in addition to legal demands for subscriber information and transactional information, we received demands for lawful intercepts. During the second half of 2020, we received 1,265 such demands regarding 1,265 customer selectors. All of these demands were for the interception of calls initiated in Germany and made to specified international numbers.
3. In India, we are precluded by law from discussing any information about the requests that we might receive from the Government of India. We are similarly precluded from identifying the specific number of websites that we were asked to block by the Government of India.
4. In the Netherlands, the Central Information Point for Telecommunications (CIOT in Dutch) program run by the Ministry of Justice requires telecommunications providers to store all subscriber data (name, address, service provided, name of provider, telephone numbers, IP-addresses, and email addresses) in a central database that is accessible to Dutch law enforcement. The information we report here does not include access by Dutch law enforcement to customer data that are stored in the CIOT database. The Dutch government provides its own report on law enforcement access to the information stored by all providers in the CIOT database: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/jaarverslagen/2020/07/09/jaarverslag-ciot-2019>. We also received 3 demands for lawful intercepts in the Netherlands during the second half of 2020.

No Extraterritorial Demands

Verizon provides cloud computing and data storage services to business customers around the world, including many non-U.S. customers in data centers outside the United States. In our prior Transparency Reports, we advised that we had not received any demands from the U.S. government for data stored in other countries during the periods covered in those Transparency Reports. Likewise, we did not receive any demands from the U.S. government for data stored in other countries during the second half of 2020. Nor do we anticipate that we will receive such a demand going forward.

Blocking Demands

On occasion, we are required by government orders, regulations, or other legal requirements to block access to specified websites. To be clear, these are requests to block access to a website, not requests to remove user content. Again, we did not receive any requests from any government to remove user content during this reporting period. While we have not received blocking demands in the United States, we have received such demands in a handful of other countries. Generally, the blocking demands are issued because the websites are contrary to laws in those countries relating to child pornography, online gambling, or copyright.

The figures below relate to the number of websites that we were required to block access to during the relevant period of time. While we may be required to block access to such websites in the specified country for an ongoing period of time, we count such demands only for the period during which they were initially made, except in Colombia. In Colombia, we are now provided with a running list of websites that we are required to block, so we now report the total number of websites designated on that list at the end of each period. We were also required to block access to websites in India, but we are precluded by law from identifying the specific number of websites.

Country	2H 2017	1H 2018	2H 2018	1H 2019	2H 2019	1H 2020	2H 2020
Belgium	10	9	11	5	0	0	6
Colombia	2,371	2,368	2,611	2,590	2,464	2,714	2,642

Greece	9	1,064	684	3	23	1	335
Hungary	43	45	45	102	8	24	37
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	1,278	1,100	2,868	1,552	1,530	2,575	1,985
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Russian Federation	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland					195	137	125