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2021 DBIR Results & Analysis
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The results found in this and subsequent sections within the report are based on a dataset collected from a variety of sources, including cases provided by the Verizon Threat Research Advisory Center (VTRAC) investigators, reports provided by our external collaborators, and publicly disclosed security incidents. The year-to-year data will have new incident and reach sources as we continue to strive to locate and engage with additional organizations that are willing to share information to improve the diversity and coverage of real-world events. This is a sample of convenience, and changes in contributors—both additions and those who were not able to contribute this year—will influence the dataset. Moreover, potential changes in contributors' areas of focus can shift bias in the sample over time. Still other potential factors, such as how we filter and subset the data, can affect these results. All of this means that we are not always researching and analyzing the same population. However, they are all taken into consideration and acknowledged where necessary within the text to provide appropriate context to the reader. Having said that, the consistency and clarity we see in our data year-to-year gives us confidence that while the details may change, the major trends are sound. We believe it is fair to say that one of the primary lessons that 2020 had to teach us was that it is often futile to attempt to predict the future. However, not trying to predict it is not the same thing as giving up on scenario planning and preparing your organization for probable outcomes to the best of your ability. The DBIR is not in the business of prediction, but it can go a long way to help you shape your response strategy in the face of an uncertain future. Consider Figure 9 for instance; it's your run-of-the-mill DBIR chart with all the slanted bar-charted goodness, courtesy of our Misuse action varieties. We have a few big things up top, and a lot of stuff near the end. One valid way to interpret this is that the top bar or two are the norm of what may happen, namely in this example "Privilege abuse" and "Data mishandling". Those are the Action varieties that are understood to be so common that, if they were to cause a breach, someone (most likely on a bird website) would say, "That organization should have known better.",Suffice it to say, there's a great deal of inequality in the frequencies of the varieties shown. Those small bars are the extraordinary and uncommon attacks that could happen but are unlikely. If they were to cause a breach the victim would claim, "It was an advanced attack. There was nothing that anyone could have done.",However, if you take all those small bars on the Action varieties and add their breach frequencies together, you get Figure 10. Now it doesn't look quite so uncommon anymore, does it? In fact, in this example it appears that a breach is just as likely to be caused by one of our myriad exceptions as it is to be caused by our second most likely Action variety. But does breach data always behave like this? Rather than show you lots of bar charts, we're going to condense that concept down into a single number. Figures 11 and 12 show some data with different levels of inequality. We use the word "inequality" not by chance, but to introduce the fact that we can calculate the Gini coefficient to represent this long tail behavior. The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion most commonly used to represent the income or wealth inequality within a nation or other group of people. While it uses a lot of math none of us can be bothered with, it ultimately represents a completely equal outcome, where everyone has the same income (in other words, the "income per person" chart is a horizontal line), as a 0, and a world where one individual has all the income (in other words all we have on the chart is a huge vertical spike somewhere) as a 1. Let's bring this closer to our subject matter by looking at some security related data, like how often your SIEM generates a group of critical alerts that need immediate review. Anecdotally, you could attest that happens exactly "every time you are on-call," but humor us for a moment. In Figure 11, we generated some simulated example data that is perfectly smooth and looks horizontal on the chart—this one has an equality score of 0 (perfectly equal). Figure 12 has actual data representing the time interval between critical SIEM events, and it is extremely spikey. It has a Gini equality score of 0.95, demonstrating a huge variation time between events. It's not just you: critical SIEM events fall into everyone's laps indiscriminately. This complicated mathematical setup is to convey the reality that in the DBIR data (incident and non-incident alike) is very unequal, but at least we can measure it. Figure 13 shows the equality scores for Action, Actor, Asset, and Attribute varieties and vectors over the last seven years. The scores range from about 0.73 to 0.94, or as we would say here, "high." Breach data may seem likely to always be the same, but some varieties are more equal than others. The reality is you don't need a crystal ball, a neural network or next gen AI to tell you what the norm is. You can do that for yourself and plan accordingly. On the other hand, you can't solution your way out of the long tail. It is made up of a legion of little things that happen only rarely—they are the exceptions to the norm. Well, maybe you can if you have enough money. And some organizations that are in critical roles to our society have no choice but to try to do so. But from a purely monetary value, if you look at what breaches cost in the Impacts section, it's not a wise use of your organization's resources to engineer solutions for every single possible exception. Armed with the knowledge of what is the norm and what is the exception, an ideally optimized solution would be to engineer solutions for the norm, and train your security operation teams to handle the exceptions. Turns out humans are very flexible problem-solvers, and most love a good challenge occasionally. The next time we are up against a paradigm-shifting breach that challenges the norm of what is most likely to happen, don't listen to the ornithologists on the blue bird website chirping loudly that "We cannot patch manage or access control our way out of this threat," because in fact "doing the basics" will help against the vast majority of the problem space that is most likely to affect your organization. Read on to learn what the normal actor has been up to for the last year, and pick out the areas where you can improve, against both the norm and the exception. Because the only way to predict the future is to change it yourself. "All the world's a stage," and our threat actors "all have their exits and their entrances." We must admit that they seem to know their cues very precisely. However, at this point the analogy breaks down a bit, as rather than "playing their many parts" we seem to keep viewing the same performance repeated ad infinitum, as if forced to endlessly re-watch a recorded musical theater presentation on a streaming service. It seems clear that our External actors are not giving up their close-ups, as they continue year after year to dominate the Actor types in breaches as illustrated in Figure 14. As a reminder to our readers, the Internal type shown here will include breaches in which both Misuse actions (where the mythical winged internal threats live in our taxonomy) and Error actions (the oopsies) occurred. Of course, an External actor breaking into an organization by leveraging illicitly obtained credentials or other illegal access to pivot internally may initially resemble an internal threat before detailed incident forensics are engaged. But even though the call may be coming from inside the house, there is still a stranger on the line. As in past years, financially motivated attacks continue to be the most common (Figure 15), likewise, actors categorized as Organized crime continue to be number one (Figure 16). However, since 2015 it is relatively common for State-sponsored actors to also crave that cold hard cash as the Financial motives for those actors have fluctuated between 6% and 16% of recorded breaches. Given this result, it should come as no surprise when you glance at Figure 17 and find that the two most common cybercrime terms found on criminal forums are bank account and credit card related. Even as awareness of supply chain attacks has increased over the last few months, the overall percentage of incidents with a Secondary motive—where the ultimate goal of an incident was to leverage the victim's access, infrastructure or any other asset to conduct other incidents—has decreased slightly as a percentage from last year. There are two caveats here that should be kept in mind: The associated growth year-over-year of Financially motivated breaches, and that most Secondary motive breaches reported to us are simple in nature (which suggests the catastrophic ones on everyone's minds are still very much the exception). However, Secondary is still in second place (fittingly enough) as a top Actor motive, as Figure 18 demonstrates. So, if you are a software developer or service provider that has assets that could be repurposed in that manner, please make sure you are paying the proper attention to the operational parts of your organization. In the same way automation may be helping you scale up your defensive operations, it can also help attackers scale up their offense. Figure 19 illustrates the relative occurrence of attack types in honeypot data. Near the top of the attacker's opportunistic sales funnel, we see scanners. Down near the bottom are where the Remote Code Execution (RCE) attacks reside. Regardless of their placement in the figure, automation is likely to assist attackers in moving potential victims from the top of the funnel to the bottom. As such, it's important to limit your public facing attack surface, through asset management, defensive boundaries, and intelligent patching. In the Secondary Motive subset, we had an additional 24,913 incidents of which only one was a known breach. In all of these incidents, web apps were attacked with a secondary motive by External actors. Beyond that, we know very little. Do we have an action-packed section for you, folks! Step right up, make room in the back so everyone can see! Figures 20 and 21 will reveal all you need to know about the frequency of Action varieties for the past year. We do not want to divert all of your attention from the brand-new incident patterns. So we saved additional details on how those Actions manifested in the wild for you to dig your teeth into there. It would be impolite on our part not to address the virulent elephant in the room, so we have centered this initial analysis of Actions on evaluating how adapting to life in a pandemic-stricken world has impacted the threat landscape. The DBIR team released a COVID-19 Threat Landscape Trends article in the middle of last year, and it is only fair that we revisit how our speculations (see how we avoided the word predictions?) fared. Figure 22 shows how the Actions we highlighted in that article varied in relation to last year's report. We highlighted Phishing, Use of stolen creds, Ransomware and Errors as Action varieties that could possibly increase. Even in a year as unexpected as 2020, there are some things we can trust to stay the same. Phishing remains one of the top Action varieties in breaches and has done so for the past two years. Not content to rest on its scaly laurels, however, it has utilized quarantine to pump up its frequency to being present in 36% of breaches, (up from 25% last year). This increase correlates with our expectations given the initial rush in phishing and COVID-19-related phishing lures as the worldwide stay-at-home orders went into effect. Phishing continues to walk hand-in hand with Use of stolen credentials in breaches as it has in the past. Admittedly, we expected to see an increase here due to a larger remote workforce. However, the numbers have remained in the region of 25% of breaches, which is still a significant number. The major change this year with regard to action types was Ransomware coming out like a champ and grabbing third place in breaches (appearing in 10% of them, more than doubling its frequency from last year). This is also something we discussed, but this may have less to do with the changes in working arrangements than it does the shift in tactics of the actors who "named and shamed" their victims. These actors will first exfiltrate the data they encrypt so that they can threaten to reveal it publicly if the victim does not pay the ransom. We are not sure if this breach double-dipping is permitted in the Threat Actor Code of Conduct, but there has been no evidence that they have one anyway. The final piece of this puzzle pertains to Error actions, where we opined that we would see an increase, but actually had a decrease this year to 17% of breaches (from 22%). This breaks a three-year streak of either staying the course or increasing. Granted, the absolute number of Error breaches did increase from 883 to 905. However, as a proportion of the dataset, Error decreased due to the rapid growth of Social breaches. Of course, we here on the team secretly blame each other for this miscalculation on our part, as any team would. Still, both in relative and absolute terms, this is a significant value and is on par with Malware-related breaches as Figure 23 demonstrates, and it should certainly be front and center in your control definition strategy. A data point we started collecting over the past few years pertains to the results of Actions, which provide some interesting insights especially when you consider it as a complement to our ongoing attack chain research. For example, a threat actor might perform a Use of stolen credentials or Phishing action to Infiltrate a victim organization, but then deploy Malware in order to Exfiltrate the data they had their sights on. The heatmap in Figure 24 shows how our most frequent results relate to our top-level Action categories. Points of interest here are how well those findings align with the attack chain information that is present in some of the incidents we analyze. If an Action is concentrated into Infiltrate, it is closer to the top of the first actions in a chain chart, as shown in Figure 25, while Exfiltrate will correlate with the last one. Misuse actions are different, as they often assume or require legitimate access to the Asset that was breached, and, as such, are very focused into Exfiltration. With regard to Malware, well, given the Swiss Army Knife behavior of modern variants, it looks like you can eat your cake and have it too. Another noteworthy change this year is the increase in rank of Desktop sharing as the vector of a Hacking action to second place. As Figure 28 demonstrates, it is completely overshadowed by Web application as the attack vector. But it is now on the 5% threshold and we recommend attention to the authentication security of those. Notably, 89% of the Hacking varieties in this vector involved some sort of credential abuse (Use of stolen creds or Brute force). If, after looking at Figures 27 and 28, you had to double check that you weren't still in 2020, you would be forgiven. Servers are still dominating the Asset landscape due to the prevalence of web apps and mail services involved in incidents. And as social attacks continue to compromise people (they have now pulled past user devices), we begin to see the domination of phishing emails and websites delivering malware used for fraud or espionage. However, we can glimpse the impact of a world where the flickering flames of digital transformation have slowly built into a sizable inferno when we review the Assets involved in breaches. Figure 29 shows that there is a large gap between Person and User devices as the most breached Assets, and the decline of User devices is statistically verifiable in relation to the previous two years. This result makes sense when we consider that breaches are moving toward Social and Webapp vectors, and those are becoming more server based, such as gathering credentials and using them against cloud-based email systems. A related result that will likely not be surprising is that this year, external cloud assets were more common than on-premises assets in both incidents and breaches. Now before you put that in your marketing brochure for your next gen AI cloud security product, there were 10 times as many Unknowns (quite plainly incidents where the information on the location of the assets was not available) as there were cloud assets. That is more than enough to tip the scales in the other direction if we'd known more about what happened. Still, in a sample of random organizations, 17% that had a web presence had internet-facing cloud assets.. If it was not obvious by now, cloud assets deserve a seat at the grown-up security table and a piece of your budget pie. Even the median random organization with an internet presence has 17 internet-facing assets (Figure 30). Figure 30 gives you an idea of how vulnerable those organizations are. Most had no vulnerabilities at all. Furthermore, one might think that more recent vulnerabilities would be more common. However, as we saw last year, it is actually the older vulnerabilities that are leading the way. Rather than selecting out of something like the Alexa top 1 million domains, we randomly sampled a database of hundreds of millions of companies worldwide. Out of a million companies, only 1.4% had a web presence (a domain connected to the organization). It's easy to forget that the average security-conscious organization might be quite different from the average company. These older vulnerabilities are what the attackers continue to exploit. Figure 32 shows the discovery years of vulnerabilities that attackers attempted to exploit in bulk as seen from the perspective of honeypots. If Tom Brokaw were writing this report, he'd call them the greatest generation of vulnerabilities. Eternal Blue is a crowd favorite, which shows that the amount of time since discovery does not really factor into why actors target vulnerabilities. Instead, it seems to be simply a matter of what capabilities exploiting a vuln provides to the attacker, along with the robustness of current working exploits and payloads. So, what's a good, clean-cut, security-conscious organization to do? Based on Figure 33, the patching performance this year in organizations has not been stellar. Granted, it's never been great. There are several likely hypotheses to explain why this year might be underperforming. The ideal state for any organization is to patch smarter, not harder, by using vulnerability prioritization not necessarily to improve security, but to improve the organization's productivity. Every patch that has to be applied means you are that much farther from putting down the keyboard and picking up the d-pad. Anything you can do to avoid patching vulnerabilities that do not improve your security keeps you just as secure but involves much less work (and less chance of burnout from your employees or service providers). Mobile phones made the list in Figure 28 at the beginning of this section. As with last year, this finding is somewhat anticlimactic as the vast majority are simply lost phones. Still, that's not quite the end of our mobile foray. We also have mobile data on malicious URLs and APKs in Figure 34. What we found, in short, was that you don't have to be a large organization to have a good chance that one of your members that received a malicious URL or even installed a malicious APK. The Attributes are the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (aka the CIA Triad) violations of the impacted asset. Whether it is a confirmed data breach in which the confidentiality of the data was compromised, or an integrity incident, such as altering the behavior of a person via phishing, the actions against the assets result in CIA violations. First, let's discuss Confidentiality and the types of data that are most frequently compromised. As we have pointed out in previous reports, Credentials remain one of the most sought-after data types (Figure 35). Personal data is a close second. Considering that Personal data includes items such as Social Security numbers, insurance related information, names, addresses, and other readily monetizable data, it is little wonder that attackers favor them as they do. They are also useful for financial fraud further down the line, not to mention their resale value. We do not mean to imply that attackers are the only way data is compromised. Sadly, we cannot discount the ability of our own employees to make mistakes, thereby contributing to the problem. However, they are less likely to involve credentials, and more likely to involve other data such as Personal information, (Figure 36). Moving on to Integrity violations (Figure 37), these are usually the result of a Social or Malware action. For the Social actions, Phishing and Pretexting will alter the behavior of their targeted victim. In some cases, Pretexting results in the initiation of a Fraudulent transaction, causing money to go where it was not supposed to. With the prevalence of Phishing and Pretexting in our dataset this year (43% of breaches) it is no surprise that Alter behavior ranks first among the Integrity violations. But we must not forget the Malware actions. Software installation comes in second place due to the high number of System Intrusion pattern cases that had a Malware component. Most commonly these were directly installed by the actor after system access—usually after a Hacking action such as the Use of stolen creds or Brute force. Finally, we arrive at our Availability violations (Figure 38). The most common is Obscuration, which is what you get when ransomware is installed and the encryption is triggered. Loss is our second most common violation, and results from either a lost or stolen asset, as you no longer have access to that data. This year we decided to take a look at which breach types take the longest to discover (Figure 39). Traditionally, this has been insider Privilege Misuse. However, when looking at this year's data (largely due to the insight provided by the new patterns), we found that the differences between Privilege Misuse and System intrusion were negligible. Both were present in the longest to discover breaches. In contrast, the breaches that are the fastest to discover appear to be those where it becomes readily apparent something is wrong. Examples include Stolen assets, because the employee found evidence of a break-in, and Errors, where the employee had that sinking feeling that they screwed up, and reported it in the hopes that it could be quickly contained. These are both internal methods of discovery, and if you don't already have an easy and fast way for your people to report these kinds of breaches, you should look into it. Why not cultivate your employees to be your early warning system when it can have a great return on investment? The other end of the spectrum for discovery methods is when the threat actor involved makes the "notification" in the form of a ransom note that appears on screen. Finally, we were also curious what kind of data was the fastest to be compromised, and that turns out to be Credentials. This is particularly the case in Phishing, which typically goes after the victim's credentials for use in gaining further access to their chosen victim organization. Attackers continue to profit substantially from the adversity that befalls breach and incident victims. And while that profit is certainly of interest, what really concerns us is how the amounts tally up on the other side of the transaction. Figure 40 illustrates the range of loss from various types of incidents based on adjusted losses reported to the FBI Internet Criminal Complaint Center (IC3). In this figure, each dot represents half a percent of incidents. First and foremost, according to IC3 data, is the fact that whether the attack was a Business Email Compromise (BEC), Computer Data Breach (CDB), or a ransomware attack, a large percentage of incidents did not actually result in a financial loss (42%, 76%, and 90% respectively). When losses did occur, they were not of the one-size-fits-all variety. Following the rules of good business, we expect attackers to charge what the market can bear. For a small organization that is usually a small amount. For a large organization, however, losses can be much more substantial. When examining breaches that included a reported loss, 95% of BECs fell between $250 and $985,000 dollars with $30,000 being the median. That is a pretty big range, you say? Maybe so, but CDB ranges were even wider with 95% falling between $148 and $1.6 million, and a median loss of $30,000. Finally, for ransomware the median amount lost was $11,150, and the range of losses in 95% of the cases fell between $70 and $1.2 million. Let us state this in a somewhat different manner: If you only consider the bottom-half (everything below the medians that we just mentioned), CDBs are often associated with bigger losses than are ransomware events. This finding, when coupled with the 90% of ransomware incidents that did not result in any loss, could be telling the story that organizations are no longer paying the ransoms. It must also be kept in mind that this loss data includes individuals as well as organizations, which is another potential reason for the numbers being smaller. Unfortunately, we do not have a sufficient level of detail to distinguish between the two. There is also the specter of potential bias toward underreporting of larger ransoms. If, however, organizations are skipping the ransom, the low payout ranges could have been yet another contributing factor for the rise of the ransomware "name and shame" threat actors witnessed in late 2019. In a "glass half full" view of the above situation, there is some possible good news in that there is a chance you can reverse the mass migration of your funds to other environs. The IC3 Recovery Asset Team (RAT) can sometimes assist victims in the freezing of lost funds for possible recovery. In Figure 41, we see that when the IC3 RAT acts on BECs, and works with the destination bank, half of all US-based business email compromises had 99% of the money either recovered or frozen, whereas only 11% had nothing at all recovered. If your organization experiences an incident, we highly recommend that you contact the local branch of your national law enforcement and seek their assistance. Or, better yet, get to know them before the breach occurs!,Of course, direct losses are not the sole cost one encounters due to a breach. Apart from the damage done by the attacker, there remains the expense of Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) and legal counsel. Figure 42 provides an idea of what to expect in these areas based on cyber insurance,It should be pointed out that insurance data can be somewhat biased. For instance, insurance may not cover legal costs or penalties. There may also be an additional deductible not covered in the overall costs. Of course, to address the elephant in the room, it is unlikely that your insurance will cover the damage to your company's reputation. And depending on several factors such as disclosure requirements, the size of the breach, and other things hiding in the fine print, that damage can be considerable. Various studies have arrived at very different conclusions regarding the impact on stock price from a breach in the days immediately following a breach, including 2.53% (Rosati, Cummins, Gogolin, van der Werff, & Lynn, 2017), 5% (Cambell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2003), 2.1% (Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004), and 1% (Goel & Shawky, 2009). The findings of these studies are helpful, but they don't shed much light on what happens in the long term. Figure 43 may help to illuminate the matter somewhat. Based on data collected by comparitech.com, breached companies underperformed the NASDAQ (a U.S. Stock Market) by about 5% after six months, though if you look at 95% of companies the performance was anywhere from 48% under to 39% over performing. If we look two years into the future of those organizations (after the breach), those downward trends continued, suggesting that perhaps the breach wasn't actually the cause, but the symptom. To answer the question, "what might a breach cost in total?" we ran 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations using bootstrap sampling on breaches we had cost information about on this year's dataset like the good data nerds we are. Fourteen percent of the simulated breaches had no impact. Of the 86% that were impacted, Table 1 captures the results. What you do with these numbers is, of course, up to you. While you could plan for the median breach of $21,659, a better option might be to plan for the middle 80% of breach impacts, $2,038 to $194,035. Or better yet, be prepared for the most common 95% of impacts, between $826 and $653,587. If you add to that an organizational devaluation of around 5% (from Figure 43), then you just may have yourself a tangible figure you can plan around. 1 - Simulated Breach Costs,Over the past decade, the cyber threat has grown exponentially with nation state and cyber criminals increasing the scale, scope, and level of sophistication of their cyber attacks. Addressing this kind of complex and agile environment requires a more comprehensive response than any one single government agency, business, technology, or data source can provide. Instead, an interwoven architecture of combined capabilities from across public agencies and the private sector must be leveraged to protect critical infrastructure and impose risk and consequences on attackers. The FBI is committed to sharing as much as possible about cyber threats as quickly as possible so the public is alerted and prepared. We strive to be viewed as an indispensable partner, using our unique authorities as a law enforcement agency and member of the United States Intelligence Community to enable government operations against our cyber adversaries and allow the public to enhance their security posture. Because of our unique authorities, world-class capabilities, enduring partnerships, and presence we can conduct investigations, collect intelligence, and interact with victims – all in pursuit of attribution. Attribution is what allows the U.S. government to impose risk and consequences on our adversaries and prioritize our operations with our partners, including the private sector. Cyber [Combatting cyber crime] is the ultimate team sport and we all must be committed to using every tool we have at our disposal to address the cyber threat. Of utmost importance to the FBI, and a key component of our foundational cyber strategy, is the ability to share relevant and actionable information with our government partners, the international community, private industry, and the public. But, we also rely on the information received from our partners, private industry, and victims to develop a broader picture of cyber threats. The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) serves as a reliable, convenient, tool for submitting information to the FBI about suspected internet-facilitated criminal activity, while also developing effective partnerships with law enforcement and private sector entities. Information provided to the IC3 is further analyzed, resulting in investigative leads or the identification of new or emerging cyber threats. We share what we've learned through our analysis of IC3 data with the public and private industry through PSAs, alerts and reports such as the DBIR. For the 2021 DBIR, the FBI's IC3 focused on supplying data specifically for business email compromises/ email compromises (BEC/EAC), and other data breach incidents reported to IC3. In recent years, the FBI's IC3 has observed that BEC/EAC and data breach incidents trend more towards victimizing corporations and/or private sector entities and less on targeting a single individual. IC3 recognizes that the public plays a central role in IC3 being able to understand how cyber criminals are evolving. By submitting a cyber related complaint, the public is assisting the FBI in addressing those specific complaints, as well as, identifying the critical details of developing cyber threat trends. Convenience sampling is a type of nonrandom sampling that involves the sample being drawn from that part of the population that is close at hand or available. More details can be found in our "Methodology" section. Though we do suggest you put your money on Trail Blazer in the third. Where are my insider threat fans at? Whoop whoop!,This report makes no claim about the validity of such a statement. Please refer to our official spokesperson and legal counsel. The data privacy of our readers is of the utmost importance to us. And completely obliterate our page count budget. A less well-known fact is that the wish for wealth redistribution led to the term Gini in a bottle. Not really, but it would have been cool if it did. A technical term of art in Data Science, we assure you. We deeply apologize to the junior U.S. senator from Vermont for the fact that the top 3% of varieties are responsible for 87% of the breaches. You're reading the DBIR, and that is a great step in the right direction, if we may say so. This argument does not consider potential incidents where loss of life or the security of individuals is concerned, as it would make no sense to assign a monetary value to that, and would, in fact, be callous and cruel. As You Like It, William Shakespeare. Anyone know if the Cyber+ trademark is available?,Or the hot ethereal cryptocurrency. Viruphant? Eleplent?Just like your Momma said. Mmm…cake. Emphasis on the "Artificial" not on "Intelligence.",See the sidebar for what we mean by 'random organizations.,A terrible "pie in the sky" joke was edited out here. You are welcome!,You know, because of patching. Just don't call them "boomer vulnerabilities," or you will start a fight. They might even tell you to get off their lawn. As we write this section, a Microsoft Exchange Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) is being actively and massively exploited that has all the ingredients to also be part of this growing background noise of exploitation activity in the internet. 2017 DBIR, Figure 56. Or your kid, or your running shoes, or something else that keeps you sane. Android apps. Observant readers may have noticed the assets section missing anything about Information Technology (IT) vs. Operational Technology (OT) assets. That's because it was largely missing from our dataset as well. We've heard those OT breaches are somewhere, but they're not in our dataset. Not the CIA that keeps the alien presence on the DL, the other kind. It would be fascinating to analyze profitability of different types of attacks from the perspective of the threat actors, but not only do we not believe we have the data necessary; we are not sure if this analysis would benefit the threat actors more than the defenders. For an additional fee, the Verizon will provide a version of the DBIR that replaces all instances of Cyber with Security. See your local Verizon representative for details. Another elephant? This is a pachyderm-filled space!,More precisely, Paul Bischoff's (@pabischoff) blog post at,Dr. Frank N. Furter nods approvingly. If you are already a Verizon customer, we have several options to help you get the support you need. Choose your country to view contact details. Existing customers, to your business account or . 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Need help choosing the best plan for your business? Chat now with an expert! Business takes place around the world, and you need to stay connected when you're outside the U.S. Which is why Verizon helps keep you connected in 210+ countries and destinations. Whether you're traveling to Mexico or Canada, or going overseas, we have plans that fit your business travel needs. $12,/line per day. Plus taxes and fees $6/line in Canada and Mexico ,$100,Monthly fee per line ,Data,Talk,Text,Multimedia Data,Talk,Text,Multimedia ,Data,Talk,Text,Multimedia ,Data,Talk,Text,Multimedia $20,/line per day ,$20,/line per day ,How you're charged depends on whether or not you add an international plan to your line for your trip. Our international plans let you use your phone in more than 210 countries and destinations outside the US: Before you go, make sure your roaming is turned on in your device settings. This allows your device to connect to networks in other countries. Important: Once your cellular data or data roaming is turned on, a TravelPass session can be started by background data, including:,You're only charged on days you use your device in a TravelPass country:,Good to know:,Your device may have 2 mobile numbers (e.g. Dual SIM, Second number). If you use both numbers when traveling internationally, charges apply per the international plan associated with each line. Cruise Daily Pass lets your phone stay connected when you're at sea. You can access:,Cruise Daily Pass provides a 24-hour session for $20 per line. Changes only apply on the days you use service onboard a cruise ship. In-flight Daily Pass allows you stay connected when you're flying internationally*. With Verizon's in-flight Daily Pass, browse the web, use apps and check your email. In-flight Daily Pass gives you unlimited in-flight data for just $20/day per line.*,From Albania to Zambia, learn about our international services and pricing while traveling outside the U.S. Get the info you need to use our international services and learn how to reach our customer service from abroad. Connect with vendors, partners and employees who live in another country. While traveling in the U.S. While traveling outside of the U.S. If your device is lost, stolen or broken, or you experience a device issue while you are traveling outside the U.S. please use the below instructions to reach the International Support Team from a landline phone:,Country,Toll Free Number,American Samoa,844-556-1352,Anguilla,011 800-50050099,Antigua,011 800-50050099,Argentina,00 800-50050099,Australia,0011 800-50050099,Austria,00 800-50050099,Bahamas,1-8443945536,Barbados,011 800-50050099,Belgium,00 800-50050099,Bermuda,011 800-50050099,Bolivia,800100363,Brazil,0021 800-50050099,British Virgin Islands,011 800-50050099,Canada,844-556-1353,Cayman Islands,011 800-50050099,Chile,123-0-020-8518,China,00 800-50050099,Colombia,009 800-50050099,Costa Rica,00 800-50050099,Croatia,0800-806028,Cyprus,00 800-50050099,Czech Republic,00 800-50050099,Denmark,00 800-50050099,Dominica,011 800-50050099,Dominican Republic,1-8001485145,Estonia,00 800-50050099,Finland,990 800-50050099,France,00 800-50050099,Germany,00 800-50050099,Greece,00 800-50050099,Grenada,011 800-50050099,Guam,844-556-1354,Hong Kong,001 800-50050099,Hungary,00 800-50050099,Iceland,00 800-50050099,India,8009190000,Indonesia,007-803-011-4627,Ireland,00 800-50050099,Israel Barak Netvision,013 800-50050099,Israel Bezeq,014 800-50050099,Italy (San Marino & Vatican City),00 800-50050099,Jamaica,1-800-2528677,Japan,001 800-50050099,CJapan NTT,0033 800-50050099,Japan Softbank,0061010 800-50050099,Latvia,8000-5145,Lithuania,00 800-50050099,Luxembourg,00 800-50050099,Macau,001 800-50050099,Malaysia,00 800-50050099,Mexico,001-8442528672,Montserrat,011 800-50050099,Netherlands,00 800-50050099,Netherlands Antilles,18442528674,New Zealand,00 800-50050099,Nicaragua,001-800-2202352,Northern Marianas,844-556-1355,Norway,00 800-50050099,Panama,00 800-50050099,Peru,00 800-50050099,Philippines,00 800-50050099,Poland,00 800-50050099,Portugal,00 800-50050099,Puerto Rico,844-556-1356,Russia,810 800-50050099,Saipan,844-556-1357,Saudi Arabia,800-8-110426,Singapore,001 800-50050099,Slovakia,00 800-50050099,Slovenia,00 800-50050099,South Africa,09 800-50050099,South Korea,002 800-50050099,Spain,00 800-50050099,St. Kitts and Nevis,011 800-50050099,St. Lucia,011 800-50050099,St. Vincent,011 800-50050099,Sweden,00 800-50050099,Switzerland,00 800-50050099,Taiwan,00 800-50050099,Thailand,001 800-50050099,Trinidad & Tobago,1-8442528673,Turks & Caicos Islands,011 800-50050099,U.S. Virgin Islands,844-556-1358,United Arab Emirates,8000-55575,United Kingdom,00 800-50050099,Uruguay,00 800-50050099,Venezuela,0800- 100-4780,Vietnam,120-11781,Please dial the toll-free number exactly as it appears. If a Toll-Free Number is not available, please dial the exit code from a landline phone, then 908-559-4899. Toll charges will apply. ** Not all countries are covered by this service. Call sales,Chat with us,Have us contact you,Already have an account?,These cookies are necessary for the website to function and cannot be switched off in our systems. They are usually only set in response to actions made by you which amount to a request for services, such as setting your privacy preferences, logging in or filling in forms. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not then work. These cookies do not store any personally identifiable information. These cookies allow us to count visits and traffic sources so we can measure and improve the performance of our site. They help us to know which pages are the most and least popular and see how visitors move around the site. We use both third party and first party cookies for this purpose. All information these cookies collect is aggregated and therefore anonymous. If you do not allow these cookies we will not know when you have visited our site, and will not be able to monitor its performance. These cookies enable the website to provide enhanced functionality and personalisation. They may be set by us or by third party providers whose services we have added to our pages. If you do not allow these cookies then some or all of these services may not function properly. These cookies may be set through our site by Verizon and third parties. They are used to present Verizon advertising on third party sites that you may visit. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising from Verizon. BackClear Filters,All Consent Allowed
Learn moreHow To Prevent Ransomware Attacks Business
How to protect against ransomware attacks effectively is a challenge not only for the world's largest organizations, but for businesses of all sizes. No industry is immune, but some are targeted more often. According to , "Rather than continue trying to gain access to major enterprises, ransomware gangs have changed tactics by . Once considered too small to justify a ransomware attack, these mid-sized targets now allow hackers to stay under the radar and extract smaller payments without drawing government or media attention." Ransomware can cause significant financial and reputational damage. And with the ever-evolving landscape of cyberthreats, it's a lot for any single entity to capture. That's why , contains data contributed from 87 organizations. This year marks the report's 15th anniversary where 23,896 security incidents were reviewed, 5,212 breaches were analyzed and 12 industry sectors along with four regions were spotlighted. The DBIR takes a deep look into how ransomware attacks and ransomware detection techniques have evolved since the report's inception. Gain vital insights into security strategies and how to minimize vulnerability to cyber attacks. Read our in-depth analysis of 23,896 incidents from organizations around the world. Arguably, the first documented ransomware virus dates back to the era of the floppy disk. the , also known as the PC Cyborg virus, was literally distributed by hand via approximately 20,000 infected disks labeled "AIDS Information - Introductory Diskettes" to attendees of the World Health Organization's AIDS conference. Attendees, without considering the risk, loaded the floppy discs into their hard drives causing the virus to encrypt files on their C-drives. To regain access, victims were instructed,Ransomware attacks have grown exponentially in maturity and complexity since 1989. A recent example includes a global ransomware attack that spread from computer-to-computer using Microsoft Windows operating system (OS), which demanded Bitcoin payment for the safe return of data (no stamps required). Another example is the hack of 2021 which was . For several days mass panic ensued because the Colonial Pipeline supplies approximately half of the fuel for the east coast of the United States, causing a gas crisis and even airlines to shut down. "From very well publicized critical infrastructure attacks to massive supply chain breaches, the financially motivated criminals and nefarious nation-state actors have rarely, if ever, come out swinging the way they did over the last 12 months," according to the authors of the ). last year, which is a shocking 13% year-over-year increase, and is greater than the previous five years combined. Almost four out of five breaches were attributable to organized crime. Their number one motive was financial gain followed by espionage. And it's important to note, attacks are not limited to particular . And according to the :,Shockingly, is approximately seven times higher than the actual extortion request. Using data provided by the FBI, the found the median amount of money lost due to ransomware was $11,150, however, some losses were in the million dollar range. And it's important to note that the per attack. Interestingly, 90% of confirmed cases did not result in losses. But costs are not limited to the financial gain obtained by the bad actor, they can negatively impact your organization in many ways. For example:,The cost of these attacks come in many forms, sometimes even in the form of human tragedy. A ransomware attack on a U.S. hospital in the fatality of an infant after computer systems were taken offline for several days. And with the rise of organized crime, it's no surprise that the to take immediate steps to harden their networks' cyber defenses. According to , 14 out of 16 U.S. Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sectors have been attacked in the past. Additionally, ransomware is judged by the to be the number one cyber threat for both SMBs and enterprises. Attacks on major brands grab the headlines, but according to one estimate, with under 1,000 employees. It's important to harden your security posture no matter the size or industry, especially as the cost of how to protect against ransomware outweighs the detriment. Defending an organization against the growing threat of ransomware means knowing how ransomware spreads in the first place, and which controls – from technology and business process refinement to employee training – are needed. Here is the typical progression of an attack:,Attacker often gains initial access into the system via phishing, unauthorized Remote Desktop Access (RDA), or vulnerability exploitation. Attacker uses established connection to . Attacker deploys ransomware payload. Attacker steals sensitive data. Attacker triggers ransomware to encrypt victims data. Victim is sent a ransom demand. Attackers may threaten to leak data or resort to other measures of force:Payment of the ransom doesn't necessarily mean you get your data back. And if payment is made (typically via digital currency), the money is likely to be subsequently laundered. This is in addition to the loss of operations and reputational damage. No matter the attacker's motivation, it's paramount to prepare your organization with the right strategy—built around adequate preparedness and rapid detection, response and recovery—so your organization can avoid compromise altogether, or at least minimize the impact of an attack, and learn how to protect against ransomware attacks. According to the , about two-thirds or 66% of breaches involved phishing, stolen credentials and/or ransomware. Here are the top ways ransomware actors typically gain initial access to their victims:,These use tried-and-tested social engineering techniques to trick an employee into clicking on a malicious link or opening a booby-trapped attachment. The resulting malware installation is usually covert, enabling attackers to access the corporate network and reach key assets within. RDA is used by organizations to enable employees to remotely connect to their corporate desktops/applications. It saw a surge in use during the pandemic, which also gave threat actors the perfect opportunity to take advantage of poor cyber hygiene. In most cases of RDA compromise, attackers use previously breached or stolen credentials, or use brute force to open accounts using automated software. This provides them with network access. 2021 held . Attackers often take advantage of the fact that organizations are behind the curve on patching all of these bugs. They particularly target applications that are designed to be accessed from outside the corporate network, like RDA or VPNs. Sometimes, the applications are run by third-party supply chain partners and have privileged access to corporate networks, as witnessed in a 2021 attack involving . Better security and incident preparedness to help prevent an attack. Confidence in their incident & response plan and ability to recover. If you'd like to receive new articles, solutions briefs, whitepapers and more—just let us know.. Preventing ransomware attacks may be difficult, but there are still ways to protect systems and reduce the risk. To help organizations combat ransomware, the DBIR links its findings to a series of security controls from the that can be enacted by an organization and are considered industry-standard for building an effective security program. It's impossible for any organization to be 100% breach-proof, especially in a world of increasingly determined threat actors. from a wide array of online threats with automated updates to help shield you from the latest online dangers. And by honing your ransomware detection techniques, your organization will be enabled to spot suspicious activity early on in order to minimize the impact of potential compromise. Signature-based detection via anti-malware can help identify known malware. Intrusion detection system (IDS) and behavioral detection looks for the tell-tale signs of ransomware activity. Detecting suspicious traffic uses network detection and response (NDR)-based tools. In addition to anti-malware software, intrusion detection systems (IDS), NDR tools, and ransomware detection techniques, organizations can gain visibility into suspicious activity by setting up honeypots and using other deception tools. Micro-segmentation will also help block any unusual lateral movement, containing the blast radius of an attack and ensuring threat actors can't get to your prized assets. Investing in cyber insurance can help the organizations prepare for the threat of ransomware. In the past, insurers have come under pressure from critics who claimed that easy coverage disincentivized organizations to spend more on security and encouraged threat actors to carry out more attacks—knowing ransoms would be covered by premiums. That is now changing, with insurers reducing coverage and increasing premiums, especially for organizations in high-risk sectors and those without baseline security controls in place. reported that cyber premiums increased across the board, regardless of the industry sector or size of the organization, and claimed that customers lacking specific data security controls have seen rates spike by 100-300%. If you have put proactive security measures in place but want to hedge the risk of a ransomware breach, insurance is still a useful option. One small mis-step could undermine an organization's security posture, and per the 2022 DBIR, this year 82% of breaches involved the human element. Whether that was by use of stolen credentials, phishing, misuse, or simply human error, people continue to play a very large role in incidents and breaches alike. There are several best practices that can . According to the , "40% of Ransomware incidents involve the use of desktop sharing software and 35% involve the use of email. There are a variety of different tools the threat actor can use once they are inside your network, but locking down your external-facing infrastructure, especially RDP and Emails, can go a long way toward protecting your organization against ransomware."Work with a dedicated team of experts to create a customized to your cyber-risk profile. Here are the steps your organization can take to help employees be prepared for a possible attack and know how to help prevent ransomware attacks. Strengthen your security and manage compliance using industry standards and best practices. Cyber security awareness-raising programs will help teach staff how to spot phishing attempts. Exercises and simulations should include all key stakeholders identified from across the business and feature different scenarios. These may include the three typical initial access vectors outlined above and the possibility that all of your organization's systems are encrypted and highly sensitive and regulated data is stolen. The best response plans are powered by tailored to an organization's specific risk profile. If you manage to catch an attack in the early stages of the , it's possible your organization could escape a ransomware attack without any data stolen and no systems encrypted. However, even organizations that did suffer some kind of data encryption got at least some of their data back How early an attack was caught will have an impact on how expensive recovery is. The per attack. Consider these tips to improve your chances of successful recovery:,1. Don't pay the ransom. that paid got all their data back, and there's no guarantee the threat actors will not still try to monetize their breach. 2. Report the attack immediately to law enforcement. Many agencies have access to decryption keys, which can accelerate recovery times significantly. 3. Engage a if necessary to understand the extent of the attack. 4. Remove all traces of the attack by thoroughly cleansing systems. 5. Restore data from backups only once all signs of the attack have been expunged. Once the dust has settled, it's a good idea to understand what lessons can be learned from an incident to enhance resilience ahead of the next attack. Stakeholders from across the business should be involved, including legal, human resources, security, IT ops, and relevant board representatives. Postmortems typically contain an executive summary and key highlights for business leaders but also drill down into the technical detail for IT stakeholders. Questions to be answered via this process include:,Consider including all events from initial access (and, if relevant, threat actor reconnaissance) to remediation. Lessons learned should span people, processes and technology. The right security assessment can help determine how effectively your security program is performing against expectations. After completing the post mortem, it's time to put those findings into action. An Incident Response report can help train operations teams to learn to identify and mitigate risks in a proactive manner. The landscape of cyber extortion is growing in volume, sophistication like ransomware as a service (Raas) or its taking many adjacent forms like Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Much of the recent increase in ransomware attacks comes down to a new business model that has allowed a new wave of ransomware: ). Just as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) popularized the delivery of software from the cloud, RaaS has streamlined the management and deployment of ransomware attacks. Bad actors, typically referred to as affiliates, pay RaaS operators/developers a monthly fee for the use of malware. Affiliates receive an off-the-shelf ransomware starter kit including ransomware payload and attack infrastructure. It's down to the affiliate to gain initial access to their victim and perform lateral movement inside the network. Often access is bought from , which, in combination with the RaaS model, has opened the door to a large number of less technically proficient cyber criminals. The RaaS operators can . should not come as a surprise, while DDoS attacks for ransom are technically not breaches and data is not compromised, they can shut down entire operations. Likely inspired by the rise of ransomware, cybercriminals have started adopting similar tactics by demanding a payment to stop their DDoS attacks. Given denial of service attacks in the DBIR, the rise of DDoS ransom attacks adds an extra complicating element to modern cyber security. While understanding how to protect against ransomware, many of the same will be beneficial to your organization. As long as organizations keep paying and hostile nations continue to shelter cyber crime actors, ransomware will remain a threat. The most successful groups are highly organized annually on salaries, tools and services. With that kind of money, it's predicted they may be inclined to compromise big game targets. There's also a geopolitical dimension. The U.S. authorities of possible attacks on Western organizations from international cyber crime groups as the world enters a new era of geopolitical instability. As these threats evolve, organizations will also need to adapt in order to find new ways to understand how to mitigate ransomware effectively. The security team that brought you the Verizon 2022 Data Breach Investigations Report can also help with to help strengthen your organization against potential attacks. Learn how Verizon can help . Verizon is recognized as a leader in the latest Omdia Universe Global IT Security Services Universe Report. Market Leaders offer the most comprehensive, well-integrated, end-to-end cybersecurity solutions available globally. Leaders also have above-average customer experience scores. If you are already a Verizon customer, we have several options to help you get the support you need. Choose your country to view contact details. Existing customers, to your business account or . . * Indicates a required field. We will follow up from your contact request using the information provided. These cookies are necessary for the website to function and cannot be switched off in our systems. They are usually only set in response to actions made by you which amount to a request for services, such as setting your privacy preferences, logging in or filling in forms. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not then work. These cookies do not store any personally identifiable information. These cookies allow us to count visits and traffic sources so we can measure and improve the performance of our site. They help us to know which pages are the most and least popular and see how visitors move around the site. We use both third party and first party cookies for this purpose. All information these cookies collect is aggregated and therefore anonymous. If you do not allow these cookies we will not know when you have visited our site, and will not be able to monitor its performance. These cookies enable the website to provide enhanced functionality and personalisation. They may be set by us or by third party providers whose services we have added to our pages. If you do not allow these cookies then some or all of these services may not function properly. These cookies may be set through our site by Verizon and third parties. They are used to present Verizon advertising on third party sites that you may visit. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising from Verizon. BackClear Filters,All Consent Allowed
Learn moreQuestions related to "how much does an international phone plan cost per month"
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