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Networx Contract Modifications
Contract ModificationsAs specified in the Networx Enterprise contract between Verizon and the General Services Administration in accordance with Section H.11, entitled Electronic Access to Contract, Verizon is posting the Networx Enterprise Contract in redacted format to remove proprietary information and is in conformance with the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 10/27/21 To add FAR 52.223-99 clause in Section I of the contract as follow: FAR 52.223-99 ENSURING ADEQUATE COVID-19 SAFETY PROTOCOLS FOR FEDERAL CONTRACTORS (OCT 2021) (DEVIATION) (a) Definition. As used in this clause - United States or its outlying areas means— (1) The fifty States; (2) The District of Columbia; (3) The commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands; (4) The territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the United States Virgin Islands; and (5) The minor outlying islands of Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Islands, Navassa Island, Palmyra Atoll, and Wake Atoll. (b) Authority. This clause implements Executive Order 14042, Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors, dated September 9, 2021 (published in the Federal Register on September 14, 2021, 86 FR 50985). (c) Compliance. The Contractor shall comply with all guidance, including guidance conveyed through Frequently Asked Questions, as amended during the performance of this contract, for contractor or subcontractor workplace locations published by the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force (Task Force Guidance) at https:/www.saferfederalworkforce.gov/contractors/. (d) Subcontracts. The Contractor shall include the substance of this clause, including this paragraph (d), in subcontracts at any tier that exceed the simplified acquisition threshold, as defined in Federal Acquisition Regulation 2.101 on the date of subcontract award, and are for services, including construction, performed in whole or in part within the United States or its outlying areas. 5/26/21 1. The purpose of this modification to Contract GS00T07NSD0038 is to exercise the first option period for the Networx Enterprise Extension 2. In accordance with FAR Clause 52.217-9 of the contract, the Government hereby elects to exercise the first option period and extend the term of the contract. - The period of performance is from June 1, 2021 to May 31, 2022. 10/27/21 The purpose of this modification is to change Section I to incorporate new FAR clause 52.223-99, Ensuring Adequate COVID-19 Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors, as mandated by Executive Order 14042: Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors. 6/30/20,10/01/19 1. To add GSAR clause 552.204-70 Representation Regarding Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (Aug 2019), pursuant to Class Deviation CD-2019-11, issued August 13, 2019 under Section I. 2. To add FAR clause 52.204-25, Prohibition on Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (AUG 2019), as prescribed in FAR 4.2105(b) under Section I. 11/26/18 1. Section I is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the attached New Section I. 10/16/17 To change Section J.12.3 Service Provisioning Intervals From: The provisioning interval for routine and Class B expedited orders shall be measured in calendar days from the service orderconfirmation date in the Service Order Confirmation to the completion date in the Service Order Completion Notice (SOCN)in accordance with Section C.3.5, Service ordering. For orders for which a provisioning interval is not defined in TableJ.12.3-1, the completion date shall be less than or equal to the firm order commitment date on the Firm Order CommitmentNotice. To: The provisioning interval for routine and Class B expedited orders shall be measured in calendar days from the service order confirmation date in the Service Order Confirmation to the completion date in the Service Order Completion Notice (SOCN) in accordance with Section C.3.5, Service ordering. For orders for which a provisioning interval is not defined in Table J.12.3-1, including services with originating or terminating SWCs that are either OCONUS or Non-Domestic, thecompletion date shall be less than or equal to the firm order commitment date on the Firm Order Commitment Notice. 6/8/17 1. The purpose of this modification to Contract GS00T07NSD0008 is to add the following language at Section B.6.5 to provide guidance for Telcordia SWC remappings as follows: When the coordinates of an NSC change, the SWC it is mapped to may change. As these changes occur to the mapping of NS Codes to SWCs, the Government will update Table B.6.5-9. The contractor will review Table B.6.5-9 on a monthly basis to update their Operational Support Systems (OSS) to reflect the new mapping. The new mapping will be effective on the first of the subsequent month and will apply to all new Service Orders and Service Orders in progress prior to the SOC notification. For example, NS Code A is mapped to SWC 1 with a last modified date of January 15, 2005. Due to the update NS Code A is now mapped to SWC 2 with a last modified date of February 15, 2008. For February, 2008, the NS Code A is mapped to SWC 1, but as of March 1, 2008, the mapping of NS Code A to SWC 2 is in effect; this change will be applied to rates returned on a Service Order SOC issued after March 1, 2008. SWC 1 mapping will remain in effect for all Service Orders with a SOC date prior to March 1, 2008. As a result the Government recognizes the potential for an invoice to reflect different rates for the same services at a single NSC based on the SWC mapping for each Service Order on the date of the SOC and it shall not be the basis of a billing dispute. In addition to these changes, the Government will also be performing a quarterly review and update of all NSC to SWC mappings in the beginning of February, May, August, and November. The Government will then post this update to the NHC. The update will change Table B.6.5-9 and result in the addition of new records showing the new last modified date. The contractor will update their respective Operational Support Systems in order to reflect the new mappings effective on the 1st of March, June, September, and December through the monthly updates These shall be applied in the same manner as described in the previous paragraph. 4/17/17 1. The purpose of this modification to Contract GS00T07NSD0038 is to remove the Service Outage (SLA) from the Verizon Networx Enterprise Contract. Specifically, changes are incorporated at J.13.1 Introduction, J.13.2 (Table J.13.2-2), J.13.3.18 Performance Objective for Service Outage SLA (Service Independent and Incident Based), J.13.4.2 Incident-Based Service Outage Credits, J.13.5.1 Notification Forms for Incident-Based Credits, and J.13.5.1.1 Form for Requesting Incident-Based Service Outage Credits. 2. The contract is modified as follows: Remove wording in Section J.13.1 Introduction, under "1. Service Outage SLA". A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is an agreement between the General Services Administration (GSA) and the contractor to provide a service at a performance level that meets or exceeds the specified performance objective(s). Seventeen of the SLAs are for technical services specified in Attachment J.13.3, SLA Performance Objectives. These SLAs are service specific. If awarded the service cited in the SLA, the contractor shall comply with the SLA. Three SLAs apply to all services awarded, except where otherwise indicated, and are termed service-independent. The contractor shall comply with each service-independent SLA for all awarded services. 6/2/15 1. The purpose of this modification is to incorporate language regarding Trade Act Agreements and Service Enabling Devices. 2. The contract is modified as follows: Section B. This section is modified to add the following language to B.4.1: "SEDs may or may not be domestic end products or end products of a designated country. SEDs are not available through this contract apart from ordering the telecommunications network service. Telecommunications network services is one of several services excluded from the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement and the other Free Trade Agreements executed by the United States Government. See FAR 25.401(b). The telecommunications network service offered under this contract has been determined by the GSA Contracting Officer to be domestic in origin. See FAR 25.402(a)(2). As telecommunications network service is excluded from Trade Act Agreements coverage, GSA has used the group offer analysis provided by FAR 25.503(c)(1) to determine that the value of the domestic end product exceeds 50% of the total proposed price of the group; therefore, the bundled telecommunications network service and SEDS group offer is evaluated as domestic." Section I. This section is modified to add FAR 52.225-5 Trade Agreements (NOV 2013) in full text. 10/23/14 The purpose of this modification is to incorporate changes to Sections B, C, G, H and J that allow the GSA contracting officer (CO) to issue Delegations of Procurement Authority (DPA) to agency warranted COs and appoint them as Ordering Contracting Officers (OCO). The modification allows OCOs to issue task order solicitations that contain non-standard requirements, such as: - Agency Unique CLINs and prices that will not be incorporated into the Networx contract - End-to-end bundled unit pricing - Unit pricing that includes all applicable taxes, fees and surcharges - Taxes, fees and surcharges may be included in the calculation of the GMS fee and will be considered billed eligible revenue - Additional billing elements - Additional deliverables The following sub-sections are modified: B.1.2; B.1.3.1.2; C.3.6.1.2.5; G.1.1.1; G.1.1.2; G.1.1.2.1; G.4.5; G.5.2; G.6.2; G.7; H.18; H.28; J.4 ;J (Appendix A),9/11/14 1. The purpose of this modification is to incorporate a change to Section C.2.1.12 Compliance with National Policy Directives. The contract is modified as follows: Section C.2.1.12: The following is added as paragraph d): Starting on October 1, 2014 (Federal Government fiscal year 2015) all Internet Protocol (IP)- Based services and Service Enabling Devices (SEDs) procured via the Networx acquisition program which make use of IP-Based Services or provide support for IP-Based Services must comply with the following standards and policies and directives to the greatest extent that they are applicable to the IP-Based service or Service Enabling Device, with the following allowable exceptions; 1. If the procuring department/Agency's Chief Information Officer determine the need for and provides an explicit written waiver: (For example; the procuring Agency CIO provides an explicit written waiver if the agency requests SEDs that do not have commercially available IPv6 functionality). 2. If the IP-Based service does not sit on the agencies' network but is instead provided on the Contractor's network, or is not provided on the public Internet. IP-Based Service is defined in Networx Section C.2.1.1, figure C.2-1 to include the following; Premises-Based IP VPN, Network-Based IP VPN, Voice Over IP Transport, Content Delivery Network, Converged IP, IP Telephony, Internet Protocol, IP Video Transport, and Layer 2 VPN Service. Standards and policies and directives; - Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires acquisitions to adhere to U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 500-267, A Profile for IPv6 in the U.S. Government - Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires acquisitions to adhere to declarations of conformance as defined in the USGv6 Test Program associated with U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 500-267, A Profile for IPv6 in the U.S. Government (reference NIST Special Publication (SP) 500-273, USGv6 Test Methods: General Description and Validation) - The September 28, 2010 memorandum from the U.S. Chief Information Officer with subject: "Transition to IPv6" - Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-05-22, dated August 2, 2005 with subject: "Transition Planning for Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) - Federal Chief Information Officers Council Planning Guide/Roadmap Toward IPv6 Adoption within the U.S. Government,6/9/14 1. The purpose of this modification is to incorporate changes to Section C related to Operational Support Systems (OSS) Security Requirements and Personnel Background Investigation Requirements. 2. The following sub-sections are modified: C.2.1.11.3 C.2.7.4.1.2 C.2.7.4.1.5 C.2.11.10.1.4 C.3.3.2.2.8 C.3.9.1.1 C.3.9.2.1 C.3.9.5,5/19/14 1. The purpose of this modification is to incorporate a change to Section B.3.2.2 providing an exception only for Broadband Ethernet Access to the rule that there must be a Serving Wire Center (SWC) price in order for a Network Site Code (NSC) price to be established on the contract. 2. The contract is modified as follows: Section B.3.2.2 b) The following is added to paragraph b): The sentence that immediately follows is the only allowable exception to the requirement that access prices for a SWC shall be established on this contract prior to adding any prices for NSCs served by that SWC. In cases where a domestic Broadband Ethernet Access price for a SWC is not on the contract, prices for up to two NSCs served by that SWC may be added to the contract. Thereafter, prices for additional NSCs may be added only after the price for the SWC that serves those NSCs is established on the contract. If necessary, NSC prices established under this exception shall be reduced to be no higher than the corresponding SWC price if and when the SWC price is added to the contract. 11/19/09 The purpose of this Modification to Contract GS00T07NSD0038 is to incorporate the following changes: 1. Section B.3.2.2 is modified to change the price structure for Broadband Ethernet Access; Table B.3.2.2-1 is uReserved; and Table B.3.2.2-7 is added. As specified in the Networx Universal contract between Verizon and the General Services Administration in accordance with Section H.11, entitled Electronic Access to Contract, Verizon is posting the Networx Universal Contract in redacted format to remove proprietary information and is in conformance with the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 10/27/21 The purpose of this modification is to change Section I to incorporate new FAR clause 52.223-99, Ensuring Adequate COVID-19 Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors, as mandated by Executive Order 14042: Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors. 1. To add FAR 52.223-99 clause in Section I of the contract as follow: FAR 52.223-99 ENSURING ADEQUATE COVID-19 SAFETY PROTOCOLS FOR FEDERAL CONTRACTORS (OCT 2021) (DEVIATION) (a) Definition. As used in this clause - United States or its outlying areas means— (1) The fifty States; (2) The District of Columbia; (3) The commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands; (4) The territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the United States Virgin Islands; and (5) The minor outlying islands of Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Islands, Navassa Island, Palmyra Atoll, and Wake Atoll. (b) Authority. This clause implements Executive Order 14042, Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors, dated September 9, 2021 (published in the Federal Register on September 14, 2021, 86 FR 50985). (c) Compliance. The Contractor shall comply with all guidance, including guidance conveyed through Frequently Asked Questions, as amended during the performance of this contract, for contractor or subcontractor workplace locations published by the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force (Task Force Guidance) at https:/www.saferfederalworkforce.gov/contractors/. (d) Subcontracts. The Contractor shall include the substance of this clause, including this paragraph (d), in subcontracts at any tier that exceed the simplified acquisition threshold, as defined in Federal Acquisition Regulation 2.101 on the date of subcontract award, and are for services, including construction, performed in whole or in part within the United States or its outlying areas. 5/26/21 The purpose of this modification to Contract GS00T07NSD0008 is to exercise the second option period for the Networx Universal Extension 2. In accordance with FAR Clause 52.217-9 of the contract, the Government hereby elects to exercise the second option period and extend the term of the contract. The period of performance is from June 1, 2021 to May 31, 2022. 8/14/20 The purpose of this Modification is to incorporate revised Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause 52.204-25 Prohibition on Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (Aug 2020). This supersedes any previous version(s) of the clause included in the contract. 52.204-25 Prohibition on Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment. More on Mod. 6/30/20 1. To add GSA Task-Order and Delivery Order Ombudsman Guide in Section G. a. In accordance with GSAM 516.505 (b): The GSA Task-Order and Delivery Order Ombudsman shall review and resolve complaints from contractors concerning all task and delivery order actions made by GSA. Complaints regarding task and delivery order actions of other agencies using GSA contract vehicles shall be directed to the ordering agency's Task-Order and Delivery-Order Ombudsman. For orders issued by GSA, see https://www.gsa.gov/policy\-regulations/policy/acquisitionpolicy/gsa\-ombudsman b. GSA TASK & DELIVERY ORDER OMBUDSMAN CONTACT INFORMATION GSA Task & Delivery Order Ombudsman, 1800 F Street NW, Washington, DC. 20405 Email: [email protected] 2. To add GSAR 516.505 Task-Order and Delivery-Order Ombudsman, 516.506 Solicitation provisions and contract clauses and 552.216-76 Ordering Agency Task-Order and Delivery-Order Ombudsman by reference in Section I. 3. To add FAR clause 52.216-32 Task- Order and Delivery-Order Ombudsman (Sept 2019) and Alternate I (Sept 2019) in Section I. 3/12/20 The purpose of this modification to Contract GS00T07NSD0008 is to exercise the first option period for the Networx Universal Extension 2. In accordance with FAR Clause 52.217-9 of the contract, the Government hereby elects to exercise the first option period and extend the term of the contract. The period of performance is from June 1, 2020 to May 31, 2021. 2/5/20 1. To add FAR clause 52.204-23 Prohibition on Contracting for Hardware, Software, and Services Developed or Provided by Kaspersky Lab and Other Covered Entities (July, 2018) by Incorporate by reference (IBR) in Section I. 2. To add FAR provision 52.204-24 Representation Regarding Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (Dec 2019) to the contract. 10/1/19 1. To add GSAR clause 552.204-70 Representation Regarding Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (Aug 2019), pursuant to Class Deviation CD-2019-11, issued August 13, 2019 under Section I. 2. To add FAR clause 52.204-25, Prohibition on Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (AUG 2019), as prescribed in FAR 4.2105(b) under Section I. 11/26/18 The purpose of this Modification is to incorporate the following: 1. Section I is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the attached New Section I. 11/16/18 To add 12 months DMRC term to the Networx Contract in Section B. The following sections are affected by this change: a. Paragraph B.4.8.2.b Payment Methods for SEDs - (page B-241) b. Table B.4.8.2-1 Monthly Payment Factor - (page B-241) c. Table B.4.9.1-8 Wireline SED CLIN DMRC Relationships footnote** - (page B-249) d. Table B.4.9.2-8 Wireless SED CLIN DMRC Relationships footnote** - (page B-252) e. Table B.4.9.3-8 Satellite SED CLIN DMRC Relationships footnote** - (page B-255) f. Table B.4.9.4-8 Management, Applications, and Security SED CLIN DMRC Relationships footnote** - (page B-258). 3/7/18 The purpose of this modification to Contract GS00T07NSD0008 is to exercise the second option period for the Networx Universal Extension. In accordance with FAR Clause 52.217-9 of the contract, the Government hereby elects to exercise the second option period and extend the term of the contract. The period of performance is from March 29, 2018 to March 28, 2019. 2/27/18 To remove Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) requirement for MTIPS from the Networx Contract in Section C. The following sections affected by this change: a. Paragraph C.2.4.1.5.1.1 (1)d. - Function Definition - (page C-69) b. Figure C.2.4.1.5-3 - The TIC Portal Security Operation Center Architecture - (page C-80) c. Paragraph C.2.4.1.5.1.4.1 4 - TIC Portal Capabilities - ICD 705 Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) (page C-90 & C-91) d. Paragraph C.2.4.1.5.5.2.2 1.c. - MTIPS Global Response Loop (page C-107) e. Table C.2.4.1.5-2 - MTIPS Security Domain Overview (page C-109). 6/8/17 1. The purpose of this modification to Contract GS00T07NSD0008 is to add the following language at Section B.6.5 to provide guidance for Telcordia SWC remapping's as follows: When the coordinates of an NSC change, the SWC it is mapped to may change. As these changes occur to the mapping of NS Codes to SWCs, the Government will update Table B.6.5-9. The contractor will review Table B.6.5-9 on a monthly basis to update their Operational Support Systems (OSS) to reflect the new mapping. The new mapping will be effective on the first of the subsequent month and will apply to all new Service Orders and Service Orders in progress prior to the SOC notification. For example, NS Code A is mapped to SWC 1 with a last modified date of January 15, 2005. Due to the update NS Code A is now mapped to SWC 2 with a last modified date of February 15, 2008. For February, 2008, the NS Code A is mapped to SWC 1, but as of March 1, 2008, the mapping of NS Code A to SWC 2 is in effect; this change will be applied to rates returned on a Service Order SOC issued after March 1, 2008. SWC 1 mapping will remain in effect for all Service Orders with a SOC date prior to March 1, 2008. As a result the Government recognizes the potential for an invoice to reflect different rates for the same services at a single NSC based on the SWC mapping for each Service Order on the date of the SOC and it shall not be the basis of a billing dispute. In addition to these changes, the Government will also be performing a quarterly review and update of all NSC to SWC mappings in the beginning of February, May, August, and November. The Government will then post this update to the NHC. The update will change Table B.6.5-9 and result in the addition of new records showing the new last modified date. The contractor will update their respective Operational Support Systems in order to reflect the new mappings effective on the 1st of March, June, September, and December through the monthly updates These shall be applied in the same manner as described in the previous paragraph. 4/17/17 1. The purpose of this modification to Contract GS00T07NSD0008 is to remove the Service Outage (SLA) from the Verizon Networx Universal Contract. Specifically, changes are incorporated at J.13.1 Introduction, J.13.2 (Table J.13.2-2), J.13.3.17 Performance Objective for Service Outage SLA (Service Independent and Incident Based), J.13.4.2 Incident-Based Service Outage Credits, J.13.5.1 Notification Forms for Incident-Based Credits, and J.13.5.1.1 Form for Requesting Incident-Based Service Outage Credits. 2. The contract is modified as follows: Remove wording in Section J.13.1 Introduction, under "1. Service Outage SLA". A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is an agreement between the General Services Administration (GSA) and the contractor to provide a service at a performance level that meets or exceeds the specified performance objective(s). Seventeen of the SLAs are for technical services specified in Attachment J.13.3, SLA Performance Objectives. These SLAs are service specific. If awarded the service cited in the SLA, the contractor shall comply with the SLA. Three SLAs apply to all services awarded, except where otherwise indicated, and are termed service-independent. The contractor shall comply with each service-independent SLA for all awarded services. 6/2/15 1. The purpose of this modification is to incorporate language regarding Trade Act Agreements and Service Enabling Devices. 2. The contract is modified as follows: Section B. This section is modified to add the following language to B.4.1: "SEDs may or may not be domestic end products or end products of a designated country. SEDs are not available through this contract apart from ordering the telecommunications network service. Telecommunications network services is one of several services excluded from the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement and the other Free Trade Agreements executed by the United States Government. See FAR 25.401(b). The telecommunications network service offered under this contract has been determined by the GSA Contracting Officer to be domestic in origin. See FAR 25.402(a)(2). As telecommunications network service is excluded from Trade Act Agreements coverage, GSA has used the group offer analysis provided by FAR 25.503(c)(1) to determine that the value of the domestic end product exceeds 50% of the total proposed price of the group; therefore, the bundled telecommunications network service and SEDS group offer is evaluated as domestic." Section I. This section is modified to add FAR 52.225-5 Trade Agreements (NOV 2013) in full text. 9/11/14 The purpose of this modification is to incorporate a change to Section C.2.1.12 Compliance with National Policy Directives. The contract is modified as follows: Section C.2.1.12: The following is added as paragraph d): Starting on October 1, 2014 (Federal Government fiscal year 2015) all Internet Protocol (IP)- Based services and Service Enabling Devices (SEDs) procured via the Networx acquisition program which make use of IP-Based Services or provide support for IP-Based Services must comply with the following standards and policies and directives to the greatest extent that they are applicable to the IP-Based service or Service Enabling Device, with the following allowable exceptions; 1. If the procuring department/Agency's Chief Information Officer determine the need for and provides an explicit written waiver: (For example; the procuring Agency CIO provides an explicit written waiver if the agency requests SEDs that do not have commercially available IPv6 functionality). 2. If the IP-Based service does not sit on the agencies' network but is instead provided on the Contractor's network, or is not provided on the public Internet. IP-Based Service is defined in Networx Section C.2.1.1, figure C.2-1 to include the following; Premises-Based IP VPN, Network-Based IP VPN, Voice Over IP Transport, Content Delivery Network, Converged IP, IP Telephony, Internet Protocol, IP Video Transport, and Layer 2 VPN Service. Standards and policies and directives; x Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires acquisitions to adhere to U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 500-267, A Profile for IPv6 in the U.S. Government x Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires acquisitions to adhere to declarations of conformance as defined in the USGv6 Test Program associated with U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 500-267, A Profile for IPv6 in the U.S. Government (reference NIST Special Publication (SP) 500-273, USGv6 Test Methods: General Description and Validation) x The September 28, 2010 memorandum from the U.S. Chief Information Officer with subject: "Transition to IPv6" x Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-05-22, dated August 2, 2005 with subject: "Transition Planning for Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) x Federal Chief Information Officers Council Planning Guide/Roadmap Toward IPv6 Adoption within the U.S. Government,6/9/14 1. The purpose of this modification is to incorporate changes to Section C related to Operational Support Systems (OSS) Security Requirements and Personnel Background Investigation Requirements. 2. The following sub-sections are modified: C.2.1.11.3 C.2.7.4.1.2 C.2.7.4.1.5 C.2.11.10.1.4 C.3.3.2.2.8 C.3.9.1.1 C.3.9.2.1 C.3.9.5. 5/19/14 1. The purpose of this modification is to incorporate a change to Section B.3.2.2 providing an exception only for Broadband Ethernet Access to the rule that there must be a Serving Wire Center (SWC) price in order for a Network Site Code (NSC) price to be established on the contract. 2. The contract is modified as follows: Section B.3.2.2 b) The following is added to paragraph b): The sentence that immediately follows is the only allowable exception to the requirement that access prices for a SWC shall be established on this contract prior to adding any prices for NSCs served by that SWC. In cases where a domestic Broadband Ethernet Access price for a SWC is not on the contract, prices for up to two NSCs served by that SWC may be added to the contract. Thereafter, prices for additional NSCs may be added only after the price for the SWC that serves those NSCs is established on the contract. If necessary, NSC prices established under this exception shall be reduced to be no higher than the corresponding SWC price if and when the SWC price is added to the contract. These cookies are necessary for the website to function and cannot be switched off in our systems. They are usually only set in response to actions made by you which amount to a request for services, such as setting your privacy preferences, logging in or filling in forms. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not then work. These cookies do not store any personally identifiable information. 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Learn moreDBIR Report 2023 - Small Medium Business (SMBs) Data Breaches Business
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You may now close this message and continue to your article. — said no one ever (except math teachers),In certain prior reports, we have compared and contrasted small and medium businesses (SMBs) against large organizations to determine whether the attack surface differed significantly between them. Increasingly, both SMBs and large companies are using similar services and infrastructure and that means that their attack surfaces share more in common than ever before. This has led to a convergence of attack profiles regardless of the size of the organization. However, what is very different is the ability of organizations to respond to threats due to the number of resources they can deploy in the event that they are attacked. The tables on the right illustrate the fact that SMBs and large organizations have increasingly become similar to each other. This phenomenon began several years ago, and by now there is so little difference based on organizational size that we were hard-pressed to make any distinctions whatsoever. Therefore, this year we decided to look at these a bit differently by looking at the implementation of security controls for various size SMBs (smaller, midsize and larger) and how they may overlap or differ. In past reports we have discussed the research we conduct with regard to controls—in particular, the work we have done with MITRE to map VERIS to ATT&CK. This year, we would like to take this research a bit more into the real world and apply it to how you would use these mappings with the appropriate CIS Implementation Group protective controls. 699 incidents, 381 with confirmed data disclosureSystem Intrusion, Social Engineering and Basic Web Application Attacks represent 92% of breachesExternal (94%), Internal (7%), Multiple (2%), Partner (1%) (breaches)Financial (98%), Espionage (1%), Convenience (1%), Grudge (1%) (breaches)Credentials (54%), Internal (37%), Other (22%), System (11%) (breaches),. At a glance for SMB496 incidents, 227 with confirmed data disclosureSystem Intrusion, Social Engineering and Basic Web Application Attacks represent 85% of breachesExternal (89%), Internal (13%), Multiple (2%), Partner (2%) (breaches)Financial (97%), Espionage (3%), Ideology (2%), Convenience (1%), Fun (1%) (breaches)Internal (41%), Credentials (37%), Other (30%), System (22%) (breaches),. At a glance for large organizations,Let's assume you're a startup — company in its infancy. You have very, very limited resources for implementing security controls of any kind. Your IT person is also your security person is also your Jack- (or Jill-) of-all-trades who wears many hats and never sleeps. The first step is to see which controls are recommended for your level of security maturity and resources. But where to begin? We like the CIS Critical Security Controls Navigator as a good starting point. It breaks down each of the CIS Controls into small, easy-to-consume chunks and then maps them to various security standards that an organization may want to comply with as their adopted standard. You will see that they are broken into three Implementation Groups, and each one is geared to the organization's maturity level. Since we're at the beginning here, we will start with Implementation Group 1 (IG1). While these are all good controls and should be on the road map, let's take a more threat-centric approach in our scenario. You can see in Tables 3 and 4 that regardless of an organization's size, they are going to face the System Intrusion pattern most commonly. In last year's report, we mapped the Controls to the pattern and showed which were most commonly going to help you in an attack. The result in IG1 shows Controls 14 (89%), 11 (80%) and then 5 (67%). When you drill further into the Sub- Controls, more granularity should guide you in your quest for maturing your organization's security posture. Each organization will need to customize and prioritize according to its own risk profile and tolerance, but it is at least a place to begin. Once the most likely suspects are accounted for, move onto the next mostly likely attack pattern you may be facing and determine how to handle that. Using data-driven information on your most probable risk areas is a defensible strategy toward prioritizing controls with few resources. Hopefully after some progress is made, your Jack-/Jill-of-all-trades can go back to sleeping at night. Establish and maintain a security awareness program to influence behavior among the workforce to be security conscious and properly skilled to reduce cybersecurity risks to the enterprise. Establish and maintain data recovery practices sufficient to restore in-scope enterprise assets to a preincident and trusted state. Use processes and tools to create, assign, manage and revoke access credentials and privileges for user, administrator and service accounts for enterprise assets and software. CIS Implementation Group 1 Controls for Incident Classification Patterns most commonly encountered by SMBs,You've been at this a while. You're not tiny, but you're not quite at the enterprise level just yet. You have been working diligently at maturing your processes in both IT operations and in information security. You have put in place the Controls in IG1 and are now eyeing IG2 to take your company to the next level of protection. With that in mind, let's take a look at the IG2 controls that cover the Social Engineering pattern, which is the second largest threat for SMBs. The first two controls are the same main categories as they were for System Intrusion, Control 5 (100%) and Control 14 (100%). However, the third control is different for this pattern:,An Incident Response Management plan is key to all areas of security but perhaps especially so when it comes to Social Engineering attacks for a few reasons. Many of these attacks, such as pretexting, tend to escalate quickly and can have a high impact. Perhaps just as importantly, employees need to feel secure in the knowledge that they have a place they can report these incidents to when they occur because the sooner they report them, the more quickly you can address them. Now let's pivot to look at the larger organizations in the SMB area. To clarify, we are still writing with regard to SMBs, we simply mean the larger companies that still fall into that category (<1,000 employees). When your company reaches this point, there are more resources available to throw at problems, whether in the form of more people, more technology options or just plain more cash, and bringing those resources to bear can yield substantial benefits. At this level you have already tackled IG1 and IG2 and are ready for IG3 controls. These Controls mature along with your organization. Therefore, let us examine the IG3 Controls with regard to the third most common pattern for SMB: Basic Web Application Attacks. The first, Control 17 (100%), we talked about in the section above, but Controls 16 (100%) and 18 (100%) we have not yet discussed. Control 16 is certainly timely, considering the SolarWinds case from last year's report and the Log4j impact discussed in this year's report, so we should have no problem seeing the relevance of this Control. Sub-Controls 16.2: Establish and Maintain a Process to Accept and Address Software Vulnerabilities, 16.4: Establish and Manage an Inventory of Third-Party Software Components, and 16.5: Use Up-to-Date and Trusted Third-Party Software Components would have gone a long way to defending against both of those cases. Once an entity has reached the larger end of the SMB scale, Control 18 also comes into play. Establishing penetration testing capabilities and incorporating their findings into the security processes can only improve the information security posture of a larger SMB. This is basically real-world testing of your controls to make sure they are performing how you expect them to. Like backups, only controls that have been tested and verified should be trusted. Now that you've already looked at the Controls and prioritized them, you know what you're most likely to be hit with and you're working your way through to the end—your ducks are almost all in a row. You have balanced preventive and detective capabilities and are on your way to being able to not only detect when something bad has happened but also respond quickly and appropriately. You have moved from the basics of putting your plan together to implementing a road map. A few final things to consider at this point: Are you looking at aligning with a particular compliance framework? Do you track metrics around security in your environment? Do your efforts result in ongoing improvements to your security posture, or do they just provide a point-in-time snapshot that says, "I was good at this moment, but then things changed"? There is quite a bit you can do when you use good information about what is happening in your organization to steer your security strategy. Report after report, and study after study, shows that many attacks are successful because network owners did not know their enterprise assets, the software they had running and where their critical data was. Knowing your environment is foundational to any cybersecurity program, so they encompass the first three controls of the CIS Critical Security Controls (Controls). After all, you can't protect what you don't know you have. After understanding your environment, you can prioritize where to apply and which controls to implement across your enterprise. At CIS we know that this will take time and resources, which is why we have prioritized the Controls and supporting Safeguards to help you plan your security improvement program. We do this through Implementation Groups (IGs). There are three IGs and are based on the risk profile and resources an enterprise has available to them to implement controls. Each IG builds upon the previous one. So IG2 builds upon IG1 and IG3 comprises all the Controls and Safeguards. We describe a typical IG1 enterprise as small to medium-sized with limited IT and cybersecurity expertise to dedicate toward protecting IT assets and personnel. The principal concern of this enterprise is to keep the business operational, as they have a limited tolerance for downtime. The sensitivity of the data that they are trying to protect is low and principally surrounds employee and financial information. Safeguards selected for IG1 should be implementable with limited cybersecurity expertise and aimed to thwart general, non-targeted attacks. These Safeguards will also typically be designed to work in conjunction with small or home office commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software. But no matter the size or complexity of your business, we recommend that all organizations begin with IG1. We also refer to IG1 as Essential Cyber Hygiene because it provides the actions necessary for an organization to defend itself against the major attack types being used by cybercriminals. IG1 is not just another list of good things to do; it's an essential set of steps that helps all enterprises defend against real-world threats. And it provides a strong foundation for your cyber maturity growth, or as your security needs change. This is a strong claim, but we back it up with our use of the best-available summaries of attacks (like the Verizon DBIR), and an open, shared methodology (the CIS Community Defense Model v2.0,Again, there is that refocusing thing we keep talking about. 2022 DBIR, Appendix B: VERIS and Standards, p. 96,And this never really hurts, does it? If you are already a Verizon customer, we have several options to help you get the support you need. Choose your country to view contact details. Existing customers, to your business account or . These cookies are necessary for the website to function and cannot be switched off in our systems. They are usually only set in response to actions made by you which amount to a request for services, such as setting your privacy preferences, logging in or filling in forms. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not then work. These cookies do not store any personally identifiable information. 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Learn moreHow To Prevent Ransomware Attacks Business
How to protect against ransomware attacks effectively is a challenge not only for the world's largest organizations, but for businesses of all sizes. No industry is immune, but some are targeted more often. According to , "Rather than continue trying to gain access to major enterprises, ransomware gangs have changed tactics by . Once considered too small to justify a ransomware attack, these mid-sized targets now allow hackers to stay under the radar and extract smaller payments without drawing government or media attention." Ransomware can cause significant financial and reputational damage. And with the ever-evolving landscape of cyberthreats, it's a lot for any single entity to capture. That's why , contains data contributed from 87 organizations. This year marks the report's 15th anniversary where 23,896 security incidents were reviewed, 5,212 breaches were analyzed and 12 industry sectors along with four regions were spotlighted. The DBIR takes a deep look into how ransomware attacks and ransomware detection techniques have evolved since the report's inception. Gain vital insights into security strategies and how to minimize vulnerability to cyber attacks. Read our in-depth analysis of 23,896 incidents from organizations around the world. Arguably, the first documented ransomware virus dates back to the era of the floppy disk. the , also known as the PC Cyborg virus, was literally distributed by hand via approximately 20,000 infected disks labeled "AIDS Information - Introductory Diskettes" to attendees of the World Health Organization's AIDS conference. Attendees, without considering the risk, loaded the floppy discs into their hard drives causing the virus to encrypt files on their C-drives. To regain access, victims were instructed,Ransomware attacks have grown exponentially in maturity and complexity since 1989. A recent example includes a global ransomware attack that spread from computer-to-computer using Microsoft Windows operating system (OS), which demanded Bitcoin payment for the safe return of data (no stamps required). Another example is the hack of 2021 which was . For several days mass panic ensued because the Colonial Pipeline supplies approximately half of the fuel for the east coast of the United States, causing a gas crisis and even airlines to shut down. "From very well publicized critical infrastructure attacks to massive supply chain breaches, the financially motivated criminals and nefarious nation-state actors have rarely, if ever, come out swinging the way they did over the last 12 months," according to the authors of the ). last year, which is a shocking 13% year-over-year increase, and is greater than the previous five years combined. Almost four out of five breaches were attributable to organized crime. Their number one motive was financial gain followed by espionage. And it's important to note, attacks are not limited to particular . And according to the :,Shockingly, is approximately seven times higher than the actual extortion request. Using data provided by the FBI, the found the median amount of money lost due to ransomware was $11,150, however, some losses were in the million dollar range. And it's important to note that the per attack. Interestingly, 90% of confirmed cases did not result in losses. But costs are not limited to the financial gain obtained by the bad actor, they can negatively impact your organization in many ways. For example:,The cost of these attacks come in many forms, sometimes even in the form of human tragedy. A ransomware attack on a U.S. hospital in the fatality of an infant after computer systems were taken offline for several days. And with the rise of organized crime, it's no surprise that the to take immediate steps to harden their networks' cyber defenses. According to , 14 out of 16 U.S. Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sectors have been attacked in the past. Additionally, ransomware is judged by the to be the number one cyber threat for both SMBs and enterprises. Attacks on major brands grab the headlines, but according to one estimate, with under 1,000 employees. It's important to harden your security posture no matter the size or industry, especially as the cost of how to protect against ransomware outweighs the detriment. Defending an organization against the growing threat of ransomware means knowing how ransomware spreads in the first place, and which controls – from technology and business process refinement to employee training – are needed. Here is the typical progression of an attack:,Attacker often gains initial access into the system via phishing, unauthorized Remote Desktop Access (RDA), or vulnerability exploitation. Attacker uses established connection to . Attacker deploys ransomware payload. Attacker steals sensitive data. Attacker triggers ransomware to encrypt victims data. Victim is sent a ransom demand. Attackers may threaten to leak data or resort to other measures of force:Payment of the ransom doesn't necessarily mean you get your data back. And if payment is made (typically via digital currency), the money is likely to be subsequently laundered. This is in addition to the loss of operations and reputational damage. No matter the attacker's motivation, it's paramount to prepare your organization with the right strategy—built around adequate preparedness and rapid detection, response and recovery—so your organization can avoid compromise altogether, or at least minimize the impact of an attack, and learn how to protect against ransomware attacks. According to the , about two-thirds or 66% of breaches involved phishing, stolen credentials and/or ransomware. Here are the top ways ransomware actors typically gain initial access to their victims:,These use tried-and-tested social engineering techniques to trick an employee into clicking on a malicious link or opening a booby-trapped attachment. The resulting malware installation is usually covert, enabling attackers to access the corporate network and reach key assets within. RDA is used by organizations to enable employees to remotely connect to their corporate desktops/applications. It saw a surge in use during the pandemic, which also gave threat actors the perfect opportunity to take advantage of poor cyber hygiene. In most cases of RDA compromise, attackers use previously breached or stolen credentials, or use brute force to open accounts using automated software. This provides them with network access. 2021 held . Attackers often take advantage of the fact that organizations are behind the curve on patching all of these bugs. They particularly target applications that are designed to be accessed from outside the corporate network, like RDA or VPNs. Sometimes, the applications are run by third-party supply chain partners and have privileged access to corporate networks, as witnessed in a 2021 attack involving . Better security and incident preparedness to help prevent an attack. Confidence in their incident & response plan and ability to recover. If you'd like to receive new articles, solutions briefs, whitepapers and more—just let us know.. Preventing ransomware attacks may be difficult, but there are still ways to protect systems and reduce the risk. To help organizations combat ransomware, the DBIR links its findings to a series of security controls from the that can be enacted by an organization and are considered industry-standard for building an effective security program. It's impossible for any organization to be 100% breach-proof, especially in a world of increasingly determined threat actors. from a wide array of online threats with automated updates to help shield you from the latest online dangers. And by honing your ransomware detection techniques, your organization will be enabled to spot suspicious activity early on in order to minimize the impact of potential compromise. Signature-based detection via anti-malware can help identify known malware. Intrusion detection system (IDS) and behavioral detection looks for the tell-tale signs of ransomware activity. Detecting suspicious traffic uses network detection and response (NDR)-based tools. In addition to anti-malware software, intrusion detection systems (IDS), NDR tools, and ransomware detection techniques, organizations can gain visibility into suspicious activity by setting up honeypots and using other deception tools. Micro-segmentation will also help block any unusual lateral movement, containing the blast radius of an attack and ensuring threat actors can't get to your prized assets. Investing in cyber insurance can help the organizations prepare for the threat of ransomware. In the past, insurers have come under pressure from critics who claimed that easy coverage disincentivized organizations to spend more on security and encouraged threat actors to carry out more attacks—knowing ransoms would be covered by premiums. That is now changing, with insurers reducing coverage and increasing premiums, especially for organizations in high-risk sectors and those without baseline security controls in place. reported that cyber premiums increased across the board, regardless of the industry sector or size of the organization, and claimed that customers lacking specific data security controls have seen rates spike by 100-300%. If you have put proactive security measures in place but want to hedge the risk of a ransomware breach, insurance is still a useful option. One small mis-step could undermine an organization's security posture, and per the 2022 DBIR, this year 82% of breaches involved the human element. Whether that was by use of stolen credentials, phishing, misuse, or simply human error, people continue to play a very large role in incidents and breaches alike. There are several best practices that can . According to the , "40% of Ransomware incidents involve the use of desktop sharing software and 35% involve the use of email. There are a variety of different tools the threat actor can use once they are inside your network, but locking down your external-facing infrastructure, especially RDP and Emails, can go a long way toward protecting your organization against ransomware."Work with a dedicated team of experts to create a customized to your cyber-risk profile. Here are the steps your organization can take to help employees be prepared for a possible attack and know how to help prevent ransomware attacks. Strengthen your security and manage compliance using industry standards and best practices. Cyber security awareness-raising programs will help teach staff how to spot phishing attempts. Exercises and simulations should include all key stakeholders identified from across the business and feature different scenarios. These may include the three typical initial access vectors outlined above and the possibility that all of your organization's systems are encrypted and highly sensitive and regulated data is stolen. The best response plans are powered by tailored to an organization's specific risk profile. If you manage to catch an attack in the early stages of the , it's possible your organization could escape a ransomware attack without any data stolen and no systems encrypted. However, even organizations that did suffer some kind of data encryption got at least some of their data back How early an attack was caught will have an impact on how expensive recovery is. The per attack. Consider these tips to improve your chances of successful recovery:,1. Don't pay the ransom. that paid got all their data back, and there's no guarantee the threat actors will not still try to monetize their breach. 2. Report the attack immediately to law enforcement. Many agencies have access to decryption keys, which can accelerate recovery times significantly. 3. Engage a if necessary to understand the extent of the attack. 4. Remove all traces of the attack by thoroughly cleansing systems. 5. Restore data from backups only once all signs of the attack have been expunged. Once the dust has settled, it's a good idea to understand what lessons can be learned from an incident to enhance resilience ahead of the next attack. Stakeholders from across the business should be involved, including legal, human resources, security, IT ops, and relevant board representatives. Postmortems typically contain an executive summary and key highlights for business leaders but also drill down into the technical detail for IT stakeholders. Questions to be answered via this process include:,Consider including all events from initial access (and, if relevant, threat actor reconnaissance) to remediation. Lessons learned should span people, processes and technology. The right security assessment can help determine how effectively your security program is performing against expectations. After completing the post mortem, it's time to put those findings into action. An Incident Response report can help train operations teams to learn to identify and mitigate risks in a proactive manner. The landscape of cyber extortion is growing in volume, sophistication like ransomware as a service (Raas) or its taking many adjacent forms like Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Much of the recent increase in ransomware attacks comes down to a new business model that has allowed a new wave of ransomware: ). Just as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) popularized the delivery of software from the cloud, RaaS has streamlined the management and deployment of ransomware attacks. Bad actors, typically referred to as affiliates, pay RaaS operators/developers a monthly fee for the use of malware. Affiliates receive an off-the-shelf ransomware starter kit including ransomware payload and attack infrastructure. It's down to the affiliate to gain initial access to their victim and perform lateral movement inside the network. Often access is bought from , which, in combination with the RaaS model, has opened the door to a large number of less technically proficient cyber criminals. The RaaS operators can . should not come as a surprise, while DDoS attacks for ransom are technically not breaches and data is not compromised, they can shut down entire operations. Likely inspired by the rise of ransomware, cybercriminals have started adopting similar tactics by demanding a payment to stop their DDoS attacks. Given denial of service attacks in the DBIR, the rise of DDoS ransom attacks adds an extra complicating element to modern cyber security. While understanding how to protect against ransomware, many of the same will be beneficial to your organization. As long as organizations keep paying and hostile nations continue to shelter cyber crime actors, ransomware will remain a threat. The most successful groups are highly organized annually on salaries, tools and services. With that kind of money, it's predicted they may be inclined to compromise big game targets. There's also a geopolitical dimension. The U.S. authorities of possible attacks on Western organizations from international cyber crime groups as the world enters a new era of geopolitical instability. As these threats evolve, organizations will also need to adapt in order to find new ways to understand how to mitigate ransomware effectively. The security team that brought you the Verizon 2022 Data Breach Investigations Report can also help with to help strengthen your organization against potential attacks. Learn how Verizon can help . Verizon is recognized as a leader in the latest Omdia Universe Global IT Security Services Universe Report. Market Leaders offer the most comprehensive, well-integrated, end-to-end cybersecurity solutions available globally. Leaders also have above-average customer experience scores. If you are already a Verizon customer, we have several options to help you get the support you need. Choose your country to view contact details. 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