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How Technology Can Help Public Safety Agencies in 2024 Business
We've got some great deals going on right now exclusively for our online customers... chat now to hear more! Author: Shane Schick,The most successful public safety agencies are always looking ahead—not just to the next potential natural disaster or public safety incident, but at the tools that could enhance the work they do every day. Even if existing equipment and devices have proven indispensable for emergency management, the industry recognizes that technology is continuing to open up new opportunities. For example, according to Verizon Frontline's most recent , 77% of first responders said they see 5G as either important or critical as they prepare, respond or assist in the recovery efforts following an emergency. Equipping teams with the best tools is becoming more important than ever as public safety organizations contend with staff shortages and . A 2023 Lexipol study found that 54% of emergency management service (EMS) professionals and 50% of police officers . Public safety and law enforcement technology can address factors behind recruitment and retention challenges by helping to act as a force multiplier, improve physical and mental wellness and safety, enhance training and operations, and improve transparency. Here are five examples of where technology can likely play a key role in public safety in 2024:,It's no surprise that 65% of the first responders Verizon surveyed want a stronger connection when they're in the field. Regardless of the incident involved, achieving quickly, and communicating with those off-site, is critical. Fortunately, are helping to meet those connectivity needs. Using 5G-powered sensors, wearables and cameras, for instance, first responders will be able to take in live captured video and photogrammetry, creating situational awareness that traditionally takes 24 hours to capture. Post-processing time of that footage can also be reduced, thanks to mobile edge computing (MEC) technology that allows data to be processed locally, rather than in the cloud and then back to a command center. Ambulances, patrol cars and fire trucks may serve different purposes, but all of those driving them are coming to rely on vehicles that provide en-route connectivity and collaboration. In fact, Verizon's survey found first responders are expecting an increase in daily dependence on connected vehicles, from 43% today to 62% in five years time. As patients are being , for example, EMS teams can use connected vehicles to transmit EKG results and vital signs that help prepare doctors and medical staff. While on-site, paramedics could even conference remotely with clinicians to diagnose injuries and provide immediate treatment. Public safety agencies frequently study data before and after emergencies to improve their approach when the next incident emerges. The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) platforms offers increased capabilities to synthesize and understand large, complex datasets, and not just within a command center. are now capable of capturing 3D modeling imagery in real time to leverage AI and machine learning (ML) to determine if storms or events have impacted the intended network design. This becomes even more compelling when you consider that drones and robotics are able to enter potential hazmat areas to evaluate what is required to remediate and restore. This could explain why 43% of the first responders Verizon surveyed said they expect to be using robotics and drones on a daily basis within five years, up from just 13% in 2023. Nearly a quarter (23%) of first responders Verizon surveyed believe they will be using virtual and augmented reality (VR/AR) daily within five years. By creating VR simulations of real-world environments like an airport, for example, public safety professionals can experience immersive, tactical training, where they practice emergency procedures and view recordings to identify areas of improvement. Firefighters can wear AR headsets and combine them with infrared thermal imaging cameras that project displays to help them see through smoke and get out of danger more quickly. With expected to cause severe storms between January and March of next year, public safety organizations will likely be trying to minimize the impact on affected communities. Tents can provide shelter to residents when buildings are damaged and destroyed following a weather event, for instance, but it can mean going for hours or days without connectivity. The value of setting up wireless emergency communication centers (WECCs) that provide charging and internet support can be seen during events like . WECCs have also been used after communities lost power and connectivity following , winter storms and other emergencies. Innovation in public safety technology often unfolds by taking what experts like Verizon learn from emergencies and developing . Early flying cell sites, for instance, have been modified and expanded into high altitude wireless kennewhats (HAWKs), tethered drones that provide service from the air. A similar approach has led to cell on light truck (COLT), satellite trailer emitting equipment remote (STEER) and business inclusive satellite onboard nomadic (BISON) vehicles. While it may not be possible to predict exactly what's in store for public safety in 2024, it's likely we'll see more of these innovations, and that they'll be combined with on-site core and MEC to make first responders even more effective. It's all part of how equips, empowers, supports and partners with the public safety sector to drive greater capabilities today and in the future. Lexipol, , June 2023, page 7. Verizon Frontline, , 2023, page 16. Ibid. page 4. Ibid. Ibid. If you'd like to receive new articles, solutions briefs, whitepapers and more—just let us know. If you are already a Verizon customer, we have several options to help you get the support you need. Choose your country to view contact details. Existing customers, to your business account or . . California residents can view our . * Indicates a required field. The content access link will be emailed to you. These cookies are necessary for the website to function and cannot be switched off in our systems. They are usually only set in response to actions made by you which amount to a request for services, such as setting your privacy preferences, logging in or filling in forms. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not then work. These cookies do not store any personally identifiable information. 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Learn more2021 DBIR Results & Analysis
The information provided will be used in accordance with our terms set out in our . Please confirm you have read and understood this Notice. By submitting the form, you are agreeing to receive insights, reports and other information from Verizon and affiliated companies in accordance with our . California residents can view our . Verizon may wish to contact you in the future concerning its products and/or services. If you would like to receive these communications from Verizon, indicate by selecting from the dropdown menu below. Please note that you can unsubscribe or update your preferences at any time. Indicates a required field. The content access link will be emailed to you. You will soon receive an email with a link to confirm your access. When you click to confirm from your email, your document will be available for download. If you do not receive an email within 2 hours, please check your spam folder. You may now close this message and continue to your article. The results found in this and subsequent sections within the report are based on a dataset collected from a variety of sources, including cases provided by the Verizon Threat Research Advisory Center (VTRAC) investigators, reports provided by our external collaborators, and publicly disclosed security incidents. The year-to-year data will have new incident and reach sources as we continue to strive to locate and engage with additional organizations that are willing to share information to improve the diversity and coverage of real-world events. This is a sample of convenience, and changes in contributors—both additions and those who were not able to contribute this year—will influence the dataset. Moreover, potential changes in contributors' areas of focus can shift bias in the sample over time. Still other potential factors, such as how we filter and subset the data, can affect these results. All of this means that we are not always researching and analyzing the same population. However, they are all taken into consideration and acknowledged where necessary within the text to provide appropriate context to the reader. Having said that, the consistency and clarity we see in our data year-to-year gives us confidence that while the details may change, the major trends are sound. We believe it is fair to say that one of the primary lessons that 2020 had to teach us was that it is often futile to attempt to predict the future. However, not trying to predict it is not the same thing as giving up on scenario planning and preparing your organization for probable outcomes to the best of your ability. The DBIR is not in the business of prediction, but it can go a long way to help you shape your response strategy in the face of an uncertain future. Consider Figure 9 for instance; it's your run-of-the-mill DBIR chart with all the slanted bar-charted goodness, courtesy of our Misuse action varieties. We have a few big things up top, and a lot of stuff near the end. One valid way to interpret this is that the top bar or two are the norm of what may happen, namely in this example "Privilege abuse" and "Data mishandling". Those are the Action varieties that are understood to be so common that, if they were to cause a breach, someone (most likely on a bird website) would say, "That organization should have known better.",Suffice it to say, there's a great deal of inequality in the frequencies of the varieties shown. Those small bars are the extraordinary and uncommon attacks that could happen but are unlikely. If they were to cause a breach the victim would claim, "It was an advanced attack. There was nothing that anyone could have done.",However, if you take all those small bars on the Action varieties and add their breach frequencies together, you get Figure 10. Now it doesn't look quite so uncommon anymore, does it? In fact, in this example it appears that a breach is just as likely to be caused by one of our myriad exceptions as it is to be caused by our second most likely Action variety. But does breach data always behave like this? Rather than show you lots of bar charts, we're going to condense that concept down into a single number. Figures 11 and 12 show some data with different levels of inequality. We use the word "inequality" not by chance, but to introduce the fact that we can calculate the Gini coefficient to represent this long tail behavior. The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion most commonly used to represent the income or wealth inequality within a nation or other group of people. While it uses a lot of math none of us can be bothered with, it ultimately represents a completely equal outcome, where everyone has the same income (in other words, the "income per person" chart is a horizontal line), as a 0, and a world where one individual has all the income (in other words all we have on the chart is a huge vertical spike somewhere) as a 1. Let's bring this closer to our subject matter by looking at some security related data, like how often your SIEM generates a group of critical alerts that need immediate review. Anecdotally, you could attest that happens exactly "every time you are on-call," but humor us for a moment. In Figure 11, we generated some simulated example data that is perfectly smooth and looks horizontal on the chart—this one has an equality score of 0 (perfectly equal). Figure 12 has actual data representing the time interval between critical SIEM events, and it is extremely spikey. It has a Gini equality score of 0.95, demonstrating a huge variation time between events. It's not just you: critical SIEM events fall into everyone's laps indiscriminately. This complicated mathematical setup is to convey the reality that in the DBIR data (incident and non-incident alike) is very unequal, but at least we can measure it. Figure 13 shows the equality scores for Action, Actor, Asset, and Attribute varieties and vectors over the last seven years. The scores range from about 0.73 to 0.94, or as we would say here, "high." Breach data may seem likely to always be the same, but some varieties are more equal than others. The reality is you don't need a crystal ball, a neural network or next gen AI to tell you what the norm is. You can do that for yourself and plan accordingly. On the other hand, you can't solution your way out of the long tail. It is made up of a legion of little things that happen only rarely—they are the exceptions to the norm. Well, maybe you can if you have enough money. And some organizations that are in critical roles to our society have no choice but to try to do so. But from a purely monetary value, if you look at what breaches cost in the Impacts section, it's not a wise use of your organization's resources to engineer solutions for every single possible exception. Armed with the knowledge of what is the norm and what is the exception, an ideally optimized solution would be to engineer solutions for the norm, and train your security operation teams to handle the exceptions. Turns out humans are very flexible problem-solvers, and most love a good challenge occasionally. The next time we are up against a paradigm-shifting breach that challenges the norm of what is most likely to happen, don't listen to the ornithologists on the blue bird website chirping loudly that "We cannot patch manage or access control our way out of this threat," because in fact "doing the basics" will help against the vast majority of the problem space that is most likely to affect your organization. Read on to learn what the normal actor has been up to for the last year, and pick out the areas where you can improve, against both the norm and the exception. Because the only way to predict the future is to change it yourself. "All the world's a stage," and our threat actors "all have their exits and their entrances." We must admit that they seem to know their cues very precisely. However, at this point the analogy breaks down a bit, as rather than "playing their many parts" we seem to keep viewing the same performance repeated ad infinitum, as if forced to endlessly re-watch a recorded musical theater presentation on a streaming service. It seems clear that our External actors are not giving up their close-ups, as they continue year after year to dominate the Actor types in breaches as illustrated in Figure 14. As a reminder to our readers, the Internal type shown here will include breaches in which both Misuse actions (where the mythical winged internal threats live in our taxonomy) and Error actions (the oopsies) occurred. Of course, an External actor breaking into an organization by leveraging illicitly obtained credentials or other illegal access to pivot internally may initially resemble an internal threat before detailed incident forensics are engaged. But even though the call may be coming from inside the house, there is still a stranger on the line. As in past years, financially motivated attacks continue to be the most common (Figure 15), likewise, actors categorized as Organized crime continue to be number one (Figure 16). However, since 2015 it is relatively common for State-sponsored actors to also crave that cold hard cash as the Financial motives for those actors have fluctuated between 6% and 16% of recorded breaches. Given this result, it should come as no surprise when you glance at Figure 17 and find that the two most common cybercrime terms found on criminal forums are bank account and credit card related. Even as awareness of supply chain attacks has increased over the last few months, the overall percentage of incidents with a Secondary motive—where the ultimate goal of an incident was to leverage the victim's access, infrastructure or any other asset to conduct other incidents—has decreased slightly as a percentage from last year. There are two caveats here that should be kept in mind: The associated growth year-over-year of Financially motivated breaches, and that most Secondary motive breaches reported to us are simple in nature (which suggests the catastrophic ones on everyone's minds are still very much the exception). However, Secondary is still in second place (fittingly enough) as a top Actor motive, as Figure 18 demonstrates. So, if you are a software developer or service provider that has assets that could be repurposed in that manner, please make sure you are paying the proper attention to the operational parts of your organization. In the same way automation may be helping you scale up your defensive operations, it can also help attackers scale up their offense. Figure 19 illustrates the relative occurrence of attack types in honeypot data. Near the top of the attacker's opportunistic sales funnel, we see scanners. Down near the bottom are where the Remote Code Execution (RCE) attacks reside. Regardless of their placement in the figure, automation is likely to assist attackers in moving potential victims from the top of the funnel to the bottom. As such, it's important to limit your public facing attack surface, through asset management, defensive boundaries, and intelligent patching. In the Secondary Motive subset, we had an additional 24,913 incidents of which only one was a known breach. In all of these incidents, web apps were attacked with a secondary motive by External actors. Beyond that, we know very little. Do we have an action-packed section for you, folks! Step right up, make room in the back so everyone can see! Figures 20 and 21 will reveal all you need to know about the frequency of Action varieties for the past year. We do not want to divert all of your attention from the brand-new incident patterns. So we saved additional details on how those Actions manifested in the wild for you to dig your teeth into there. It would be impolite on our part not to address the virulent elephant in the room, so we have centered this initial analysis of Actions on evaluating how adapting to life in a pandemic-stricken world has impacted the threat landscape. The DBIR team released a COVID-19 Threat Landscape Trends article in the middle of last year, and it is only fair that we revisit how our speculations (see how we avoided the word predictions?) fared. Figure 22 shows how the Actions we highlighted in that article varied in relation to last year's report. We highlighted Phishing, Use of stolen creds, Ransomware and Errors as Action varieties that could possibly increase. Even in a year as unexpected as 2020, there are some things we can trust to stay the same. Phishing remains one of the top Action varieties in breaches and has done so for the past two years. Not content to rest on its scaly laurels, however, it has utilized quarantine to pump up its frequency to being present in 36% of breaches, (up from 25% last year). This increase correlates with our expectations given the initial rush in phishing and COVID-19-related phishing lures as the worldwide stay-at-home orders went into effect. Phishing continues to walk hand-in hand with Use of stolen credentials in breaches as it has in the past. Admittedly, we expected to see an increase here due to a larger remote workforce. However, the numbers have remained in the region of 25% of breaches, which is still a significant number. The major change this year with regard to action types was Ransomware coming out like a champ and grabbing third place in breaches (appearing in 10% of them, more than doubling its frequency from last year). This is also something we discussed, but this may have less to do with the changes in working arrangements than it does the shift in tactics of the actors who "named and shamed" their victims. These actors will first exfiltrate the data they encrypt so that they can threaten to reveal it publicly if the victim does not pay the ransom. We are not sure if this breach double-dipping is permitted in the Threat Actor Code of Conduct, but there has been no evidence that they have one anyway. The final piece of this puzzle pertains to Error actions, where we opined that we would see an increase, but actually had a decrease this year to 17% of breaches (from 22%). This breaks a three-year streak of either staying the course or increasing. Granted, the absolute number of Error breaches did increase from 883 to 905. However, as a proportion of the dataset, Error decreased due to the rapid growth of Social breaches. Of course, we here on the team secretly blame each other for this miscalculation on our part, as any team would. Still, both in relative and absolute terms, this is a significant value and is on par with Malware-related breaches as Figure 23 demonstrates, and it should certainly be front and center in your control definition strategy. A data point we started collecting over the past few years pertains to the results of Actions, which provide some interesting insights especially when you consider it as a complement to our ongoing attack chain research. For example, a threat actor might perform a Use of stolen credentials or Phishing action to Infiltrate a victim organization, but then deploy Malware in order to Exfiltrate the data they had their sights on. The heatmap in Figure 24 shows how our most frequent results relate to our top-level Action categories. Points of interest here are how well those findings align with the attack chain information that is present in some of the incidents we analyze. If an Action is concentrated into Infiltrate, it is closer to the top of the first actions in a chain chart, as shown in Figure 25, while Exfiltrate will correlate with the last one. Misuse actions are different, as they often assume or require legitimate access to the Asset that was breached, and, as such, are very focused into Exfiltration. With regard to Malware, well, given the Swiss Army Knife behavior of modern variants, it looks like you can eat your cake and have it too. Another noteworthy change this year is the increase in rank of Desktop sharing as the vector of a Hacking action to second place. As Figure 28 demonstrates, it is completely overshadowed by Web application as the attack vector. But it is now on the 5% threshold and we recommend attention to the authentication security of those. Notably, 89% of the Hacking varieties in this vector involved some sort of credential abuse (Use of stolen creds or Brute force). If, after looking at Figures 27 and 28, you had to double check that you weren't still in 2020, you would be forgiven. Servers are still dominating the Asset landscape due to the prevalence of web apps and mail services involved in incidents. And as social attacks continue to compromise people (they have now pulled past user devices), we begin to see the domination of phishing emails and websites delivering malware used for fraud or espionage. However, we can glimpse the impact of a world where the flickering flames of digital transformation have slowly built into a sizable inferno when we review the Assets involved in breaches. Figure 29 shows that there is a large gap between Person and User devices as the most breached Assets, and the decline of User devices is statistically verifiable in relation to the previous two years. This result makes sense when we consider that breaches are moving toward Social and Webapp vectors, and those are becoming more server based, such as gathering credentials and using them against cloud-based email systems. A related result that will likely not be surprising is that this year, external cloud assets were more common than on-premises assets in both incidents and breaches. Now before you put that in your marketing brochure for your next gen AI cloud security product, there were 10 times as many Unknowns (quite plainly incidents where the information on the location of the assets was not available) as there were cloud assets. That is more than enough to tip the scales in the other direction if we'd known more about what happened. Still, in a sample of random organizations, 17% that had a web presence had internet-facing cloud assets.. If it was not obvious by now, cloud assets deserve a seat at the grown-up security table and a piece of your budget pie. Even the median random organization with an internet presence has 17 internet-facing assets (Figure 30). Figure 30 gives you an idea of how vulnerable those organizations are. Most had no vulnerabilities at all. Furthermore, one might think that more recent vulnerabilities would be more common. However, as we saw last year, it is actually the older vulnerabilities that are leading the way. Rather than selecting out of something like the Alexa top 1 million domains, we randomly sampled a database of hundreds of millions of companies worldwide. Out of a million companies, only 1.4% had a web presence (a domain connected to the organization). It's easy to forget that the average security-conscious organization might be quite different from the average company. These older vulnerabilities are what the attackers continue to exploit. Figure 32 shows the discovery years of vulnerabilities that attackers attempted to exploit in bulk as seen from the perspective of honeypots. If Tom Brokaw were writing this report, he'd call them the greatest generation of vulnerabilities. Eternal Blue is a crowd favorite, which shows that the amount of time since discovery does not really factor into why actors target vulnerabilities. Instead, it seems to be simply a matter of what capabilities exploiting a vuln provides to the attacker, along with the robustness of current working exploits and payloads. So, what's a good, clean-cut, security-conscious organization to do? Based on Figure 33, the patching performance this year in organizations has not been stellar. Granted, it's never been great. There are several likely hypotheses to explain why this year might be underperforming. The ideal state for any organization is to patch smarter, not harder, by using vulnerability prioritization not necessarily to improve security, but to improve the organization's productivity. Every patch that has to be applied means you are that much farther from putting down the keyboard and picking up the d-pad. Anything you can do to avoid patching vulnerabilities that do not improve your security keeps you just as secure but involves much less work (and less chance of burnout from your employees or service providers). Mobile phones made the list in Figure 28 at the beginning of this section. As with last year, this finding is somewhat anticlimactic as the vast majority are simply lost phones. Still, that's not quite the end of our mobile foray. We also have mobile data on malicious URLs and APKs in Figure 34. What we found, in short, was that you don't have to be a large organization to have a good chance that one of your members that received a malicious URL or even installed a malicious APK. The Attributes are the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (aka the CIA Triad) violations of the impacted asset. Whether it is a confirmed data breach in which the confidentiality of the data was compromised, or an integrity incident, such as altering the behavior of a person via phishing, the actions against the assets result in CIA violations. First, let's discuss Confidentiality and the types of data that are most frequently compromised. As we have pointed out in previous reports, Credentials remain one of the most sought-after data types (Figure 35). Personal data is a close second. Considering that Personal data includes items such as Social Security numbers, insurance related information, names, addresses, and other readily monetizable data, it is little wonder that attackers favor them as they do. They are also useful for financial fraud further down the line, not to mention their resale value. We do not mean to imply that attackers are the only way data is compromised. Sadly, we cannot discount the ability of our own employees to make mistakes, thereby contributing to the problem. However, they are less likely to involve credentials, and more likely to involve other data such as Personal information, (Figure 36). Moving on to Integrity violations (Figure 37), these are usually the result of a Social or Malware action. For the Social actions, Phishing and Pretexting will alter the behavior of their targeted victim. In some cases, Pretexting results in the initiation of a Fraudulent transaction, causing money to go where it was not supposed to. With the prevalence of Phishing and Pretexting in our dataset this year (43% of breaches) it is no surprise that Alter behavior ranks first among the Integrity violations. But we must not forget the Malware actions. Software installation comes in second place due to the high number of System Intrusion pattern cases that had a Malware component. Most commonly these were directly installed by the actor after system access—usually after a Hacking action such as the Use of stolen creds or Brute force. Finally, we arrive at our Availability violations (Figure 38). The most common is Obscuration, which is what you get when ransomware is installed and the encryption is triggered. Loss is our second most common violation, and results from either a lost or stolen asset, as you no longer have access to that data. This year we decided to take a look at which breach types take the longest to discover (Figure 39). Traditionally, this has been insider Privilege Misuse. However, when looking at this year's data (largely due to the insight provided by the new patterns), we found that the differences between Privilege Misuse and System intrusion were negligible. Both were present in the longest to discover breaches. In contrast, the breaches that are the fastest to discover appear to be those where it becomes readily apparent something is wrong. Examples include Stolen assets, because the employee found evidence of a break-in, and Errors, where the employee had that sinking feeling that they screwed up, and reported it in the hopes that it could be quickly contained. These are both internal methods of discovery, and if you don't already have an easy and fast way for your people to report these kinds of breaches, you should look into it. Why not cultivate your employees to be your early warning system when it can have a great return on investment? The other end of the spectrum for discovery methods is when the threat actor involved makes the "notification" in the form of a ransom note that appears on screen. Finally, we were also curious what kind of data was the fastest to be compromised, and that turns out to be Credentials. This is particularly the case in Phishing, which typically goes after the victim's credentials for use in gaining further access to their chosen victim organization. Attackers continue to profit substantially from the adversity that befalls breach and incident victims. And while that profit is certainly of interest, what really concerns us is how the amounts tally up on the other side of the transaction. Figure 40 illustrates the range of loss from various types of incidents based on adjusted losses reported to the FBI Internet Criminal Complaint Center (IC3). In this figure, each dot represents half a percent of incidents. First and foremost, according to IC3 data, is the fact that whether the attack was a Business Email Compromise (BEC), Computer Data Breach (CDB), or a ransomware attack, a large percentage of incidents did not actually result in a financial loss (42%, 76%, and 90% respectively). When losses did occur, they were not of the one-size-fits-all variety. Following the rules of good business, we expect attackers to charge what the market can bear. For a small organization that is usually a small amount. For a large organization, however, losses can be much more substantial. When examining breaches that included a reported loss, 95% of BECs fell between $250 and $985,000 dollars with $30,000 being the median. That is a pretty big range, you say? Maybe so, but CDB ranges were even wider with 95% falling between $148 and $1.6 million, and a median loss of $30,000. Finally, for ransomware the median amount lost was $11,150, and the range of losses in 95% of the cases fell between $70 and $1.2 million. Let us state this in a somewhat different manner: If you only consider the bottom-half (everything below the medians that we just mentioned), CDBs are often associated with bigger losses than are ransomware events. This finding, when coupled with the 90% of ransomware incidents that did not result in any loss, could be telling the story that organizations are no longer paying the ransoms. It must also be kept in mind that this loss data includes individuals as well as organizations, which is another potential reason for the numbers being smaller. Unfortunately, we do not have a sufficient level of detail to distinguish between the two. There is also the specter of potential bias toward underreporting of larger ransoms. If, however, organizations are skipping the ransom, the low payout ranges could have been yet another contributing factor for the rise of the ransomware "name and shame" threat actors witnessed in late 2019. In a "glass half full" view of the above situation, there is some possible good news in that there is a chance you can reverse the mass migration of your funds to other environs. The IC3 Recovery Asset Team (RAT) can sometimes assist victims in the freezing of lost funds for possible recovery. In Figure 41, we see that when the IC3 RAT acts on BECs, and works with the destination bank, half of all US-based business email compromises had 99% of the money either recovered or frozen, whereas only 11% had nothing at all recovered. If your organization experiences an incident, we highly recommend that you contact the local branch of your national law enforcement and seek their assistance. Or, better yet, get to know them before the breach occurs!,Of course, direct losses are not the sole cost one encounters due to a breach. Apart from the damage done by the attacker, there remains the expense of Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) and legal counsel. Figure 42 provides an idea of what to expect in these areas based on cyber insurance,It should be pointed out that insurance data can be somewhat biased. For instance, insurance may not cover legal costs or penalties. There may also be an additional deductible not covered in the overall costs. Of course, to address the elephant in the room, it is unlikely that your insurance will cover the damage to your company's reputation. And depending on several factors such as disclosure requirements, the size of the breach, and other things hiding in the fine print, that damage can be considerable. Various studies have arrived at very different conclusions regarding the impact on stock price from a breach in the days immediately following a breach, including 2.53% (Rosati, Cummins, Gogolin, van der Werff, & Lynn, 2017), 5% (Cambell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2003), 2.1% (Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004), and 1% (Goel & Shawky, 2009). The findings of these studies are helpful, but they don't shed much light on what happens in the long term. Figure 43 may help to illuminate the matter somewhat. Based on data collected by comparitech.com, breached companies underperformed the NASDAQ (a U.S. Stock Market) by about 5% after six months, though if you look at 95% of companies the performance was anywhere from 48% under to 39% over performing. If we look two years into the future of those organizations (after the breach), those downward trends continued, suggesting that perhaps the breach wasn't actually the cause, but the symptom. To answer the question, "what might a breach cost in total?" we ran 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations using bootstrap sampling on breaches we had cost information about on this year's dataset like the good data nerds we are. Fourteen percent of the simulated breaches had no impact. Of the 86% that were impacted, Table 1 captures the results. What you do with these numbers is, of course, up to you. While you could plan for the median breach of $21,659, a better option might be to plan for the middle 80% of breach impacts, $2,038 to $194,035. Or better yet, be prepared for the most common 95% of impacts, between $826 and $653,587. If you add to that an organizational devaluation of around 5% (from Figure 43), then you just may have yourself a tangible figure you can plan around. 1 - Simulated Breach Costs,Over the past decade, the cyber threat has grown exponentially with nation state and cyber criminals increasing the scale, scope, and level of sophistication of their cyber attacks. Addressing this kind of complex and agile environment requires a more comprehensive response than any one single government agency, business, technology, or data source can provide. Instead, an interwoven architecture of combined capabilities from across public agencies and the private sector must be leveraged to protect critical infrastructure and impose risk and consequences on attackers. The FBI is committed to sharing as much as possible about cyber threats as quickly as possible so the public is alerted and prepared. We strive to be viewed as an indispensable partner, using our unique authorities as a law enforcement agency and member of the United States Intelligence Community to enable government operations against our cyber adversaries and allow the public to enhance their security posture. Because of our unique authorities, world-class capabilities, enduring partnerships, and presence we can conduct investigations, collect intelligence, and interact with victims – all in pursuit of attribution. Attribution is what allows the U.S. government to impose risk and consequences on our adversaries and prioritize our operations with our partners, including the private sector. Cyber [Combatting cyber crime] is the ultimate team sport and we all must be committed to using every tool we have at our disposal to address the cyber threat. Of utmost importance to the FBI, and a key component of our foundational cyber strategy, is the ability to share relevant and actionable information with our government partners, the international community, private industry, and the public. But, we also rely on the information received from our partners, private industry, and victims to develop a broader picture of cyber threats. The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) serves as a reliable, convenient, tool for submitting information to the FBI about suspected internet-facilitated criminal activity, while also developing effective partnerships with law enforcement and private sector entities. Information provided to the IC3 is further analyzed, resulting in investigative leads or the identification of new or emerging cyber threats. We share what we've learned through our analysis of IC3 data with the public and private industry through PSAs, alerts and reports such as the DBIR. For the 2021 DBIR, the FBI's IC3 focused on supplying data specifically for business email compromises/ email compromises (BEC/EAC), and other data breach incidents reported to IC3. In recent years, the FBI's IC3 has observed that BEC/EAC and data breach incidents trend more towards victimizing corporations and/or private sector entities and less on targeting a single individual. IC3 recognizes that the public plays a central role in IC3 being able to understand how cyber criminals are evolving. By submitting a cyber related complaint, the public is assisting the FBI in addressing those specific complaints, as well as, identifying the critical details of developing cyber threat trends. Convenience sampling is a type of nonrandom sampling that involves the sample being drawn from that part of the population that is close at hand or available. More details can be found in our "Methodology" section. Though we do suggest you put your money on Trail Blazer in the third. Where are my insider threat fans at? Whoop whoop!,This report makes no claim about the validity of such a statement. Please refer to our official spokesperson and legal counsel. The data privacy of our readers is of the utmost importance to us. And completely obliterate our page count budget. A less well-known fact is that the wish for wealth redistribution led to the term Gini in a bottle. Not really, but it would have been cool if it did. A technical term of art in Data Science, we assure you. We deeply apologize to the junior U.S. senator from Vermont for the fact that the top 3% of varieties are responsible for 87% of the breaches. You're reading the DBIR, and that is a great step in the right direction, if we may say so. This argument does not consider potential incidents where loss of life or the security of individuals is concerned, as it would make no sense to assign a monetary value to that, and would, in fact, be callous and cruel. As You Like It, William Shakespeare. Anyone know if the Cyber+ trademark is available?,Or the hot ethereal cryptocurrency. Viruphant? Eleplent?Just like your Momma said. Mmm…cake. Emphasis on the "Artificial" not on "Intelligence.",See the sidebar for what we mean by 'random organizations.,A terrible "pie in the sky" joke was edited out here. You are welcome!,You know, because of patching. Just don't call them "boomer vulnerabilities," or you will start a fight. They might even tell you to get off their lawn. As we write this section, a Microsoft Exchange Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) is being actively and massively exploited that has all the ingredients to also be part of this growing background noise of exploitation activity in the internet. 2017 DBIR, Figure 56. Or your kid, or your running shoes, or something else that keeps you sane. Android apps. Observant readers may have noticed the assets section missing anything about Information Technology (IT) vs. Operational Technology (OT) assets. That's because it was largely missing from our dataset as well. We've heard those OT breaches are somewhere, but they're not in our dataset. Not the CIA that keeps the alien presence on the DL, the other kind. It would be fascinating to analyze profitability of different types of attacks from the perspective of the threat actors, but not only do we not believe we have the data necessary; we are not sure if this analysis would benefit the threat actors more than the defenders. For an additional fee, the Verizon will provide a version of the DBIR that replaces all instances of Cyber with Security. See your local Verizon representative for details. Another elephant? This is a pachyderm-filled space!,More precisely, Paul Bischoff's (@pabischoff) blog post at,Dr. Frank N. Furter nods approvingly. If you are already a Verizon customer, we have several options to help you get the support you need. Choose your country to view contact details. Existing customers, to your business account or . 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These cookies enable the website to provide enhanced functionality and personalisation. They may be set by us or by third party providers whose services we have added to our pages. If you do not allow these cookies then some or all of these services may not function properly. These cookies may be set through our site by Verizon and third parties. They are used to present Verizon advertising on third party sites that you may visit. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising from Verizon. BackClear Filters,All Consent Allowed
Learn moreDBIR Report 2023 - Results and Analysis - Intro Business
The information provided will be used in accordance with our terms set out in our . Please confirm you have read and understood this Notice. By submitting the form, you are agreeing to receive insights, reports and other information from Verizon and affiliated companies in accordance with our . California residents can view our . Verizon may wish to contact you in the future concerning its products and/or services. If you would like to receive these communications from Verizon, indicate by selecting from the dropdown menu below. Please note that you can unsubscribe or update your preferences at any time. Indicates a required field. The content access link will be emailed to you. You will soon receive an email with a link to confirm your access, or follow the link below. You may now close this message and continue to your article. Hello friends, and welcome to the "Results and analysis" section. This is where we cover the highlights we found in the data this year. This dataset is collected from a variety of sources, including our own VTRAC investigators, reports provided by our data contributors and publicly disclosed security incidents. Since data contributors come and go, one of our priorities is to make sure we can get broad representation on different types of security incidents and the countries where they occur. This ebb and flow of contributors obviously influences our dataset, and we will do our best to provide context on those potential biases where applicable. As some of you may have noticed over the years, the incident data collection we do is based on the VERIS Framework. It has been the bedrock upon which our multiyear dataset has been built and is what allows us to be able to speak with confidence when trends in the attack landscape surface. Our dataset currently contains 953,894 incidents, of which 254,968 are confirmed breaches, and we can't wait to celebrate with you when we reach 1 million incidents!,In VERIS, the core categories we use to describe an incident are called the 4As: Actor (who), Action (how), Asset (where) and Attribute (what). An incident needs all these four to be "complete," even if at the end of the day some of those are unknown to the parties investigating the incident. Keep an eye out for our instructive callouts in each of those sub-sections giving more context on our VERIS categories. Let's go over the results for each one of these. Life can be scary and unpredictable, which is why we like to start our results discussion with the cozy and familiar Actor analysis. It really is true, as they say, that the only certainties in life are death, taxes and External actors. As Figure 11 demonstrates, External actors were responsible for 83% of breaches, while Internal ones account for 19%. It is worth reminding our readers that Internal actors are not only responsible for intentional harm in these cases, but they are also just as likely to be responsible for Error actions. Regardless, the clear frequency of External actors as instigators of breaches is a datapoint that has held steady ever since we started this gig. External threats originate from sources outside of the organization and its network of partners. Examples include criminal groups, lone hackers, former employees and government entities. This category also includes God (as in "acts of"), "Mother Nature" and random chance. Typically, no trust or privilege is implied for external entities. Internal threats are those originating from within the organization. This encompasses company full-time employees, independent contractors, interns and other staff. Insiders are trusted and privileged (some more than others). Partners include any third party sharing a business relationship with the organization. This includes suppliers, vendors, hosting providers and outsourced IT support. Some level of trust and privilege is usually implied between business partners. Note that an attacker could use a partner as a vector, but that does not make the partner the Actor in this case. The partner has to initiate the incident. Long-time readers of the report will be similarly shocked to learn that Financial motives still drive the vast majority of breaches (Figure 12), showing growth in relation to last year with a whopping 94.6% representation in breaches. If we look inside to see which external actors are the hardest working, the top performer is Organized crime (Figure 13). What is most interesting in Figure 13, however, is realizing that the internal variety of End-user shows up more often than the external variety State-sponsored attackers. Those organization employees are mostly involved in Misuse (read, internal malicious activity) and Errors (accidents), which suggests where we should be paying more attention on our day-to-day security management. This is relevant because we were expecting some increased activity in State-sponsored attacks, be it Espionage-related or not, due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Even with anecdotal evidence of increased ideology or hacktivism-related attacks stemming from the geopolitical discussion, it really isn't making a dent in larger statistical terms. It is also worth noting that this kind of activity would also be unlikely to disrupt our average reader's organization. Action, as the name would imply, is what brings dynamism to our report. What dastardly deeds have the threat actors been up to? If you replied "ransomware," we'd say you have no imagination, but you would also be right. This pesky Malware variety has been holding our talking points hostage for years now, and we can't scrounge up enough cryptocurrency to pay the ransom!,Figures 14, 15, 16 and 17 describe the top Action varieties (what happened in more detail) and vectors (how those actions came to pass). attempts to intentionally access or harm information assets without (or exceeding) authorization by circumventing or thwarting logical security mechanisms. any malicious software, script or code run on a device that alters its state or function without the owner's informed consent. anything done (or left undone) incorrectly or inadvertently. employ deception, manipulation, intimidation, etc. to exploit the human element, or users, of information assets. use of entrusted organizational resources or privileges for any purpose or manner contrary to that which was intended. deliberate threats that involve proximity, possession or force. not only includes natural events such as earthquakes and floods but also hazards associated with the immediate environment or infrastructure in which assets are located. As expected, the charts are led by either first-stage or single-stage attacks, namely Use of stolen creds for breaches and Denial of Service for incidents. This is consistent with previous years. What is concerning, if unsurprising, is having Ransomware take over the second spot in incidents, now being present in 15.5% of all incidents. Meanwhile, the share of Ransomware did not grow in breaches and held steady (statistically, at least) at 24%. You can see the evolution of both in Figure 18. That almost a quarter of breaches involve a Ransomware step continues to be a staggering result. However, we had been anticipating that Ransomware would soon be hitting its theoretical ceiling, by which we mean that all the incidents that could have Ransomware, would have. Ransomware is present today in more than 62% of all incidents committed by Organized crime actors and in 59% of all incidents with a Financial motivation, so sadly there is still some room for growth. Eagle-eyed readers will notice the absence of Partner and Software update as action vectors for incidents this year, in contrast to last year's "software supply chainpocalypse." Instead, our collective Christmas was ruined by another Ghost of Technical Debt Past: the Log4j vulnerability popularly known as CVE-2021-44228. We will be spending some time digging into the Log4j vulnerability in the "System Intrusion" section, but it is worth noting that the presence of the Exploit vuln action has kept stable in incidents and is actually less prominent in breaches, dropping from 7% to 5%. So, did the collective security industry sacrifice its holidays for nothing?,Not quite. This is one of those cases where the alternatives are just more popular. Use of stolen creds, our current champion, increased its share from 41.6% to 44.7%, which more than accounts for the drop in Exploit vuln. More importantly, there was swift action from the community to spread awareness and patch all the different systems that had Log4j as a component. That surely helped avert a bigger disaster, so our success makes it look like it wasn't a big deal after all. In fact, Log4j was so top-of-mind in our data contributors' incident response that 90% of incidents with Exploit vuln as an action had "Log4j," or "CVE- 2021-44228" in the comments section. Granted, only 20.6% of the incidents had comments at all, so even if it can't fully represent the whole dataset, it certainly speaks to how significant the vulnerability was in late 2021 and early 2022 for the incident response teams. Finally, before I lose your attention, we should touch base on Loss. This action variety describes losing a physical device or media by accident and is often paired with the Carelessness action vector. It did show up fairly high in incidents. This is often because the data could not be confirmed as having been accessed and was therefore considered at risk rather than a breach. It is worth pointing out though that those were mostly concentrated in the data from some of our public sector contributors, where this sort of event is more tightly reported. Regardless, we know everyone was super excited about leaving the house again as the pandemic waned, but please keep an eye on your stuff when you go work from the coffee shop. In case you just wandered out of an Accounting 101 class, our Assets are more than the numbers that you list on the left side of your balance sheet. They encompass the entities that can be affected in an incident or breach and end up being manipulated by the threat actors for their nefarious goals. The callout box describes some of the most common top-level Assets in VERIS and some of the most common attack patterns that target them. Figure 19 has the breakdown of varieties of Assets affected in breaches, and the results are pretty much what would be expected given the focus of System Intrusion, Basic Web Application Attacks and Social Engineering as the top attack patterns this year. We can see a small fluctuation on the top three, as slightly less Servers were affected and slightly more User devices, but this order has held true for at least a couple of years, ever since Person overtook the second spot. Don't forget that in VERIS, people are assets too, and they are the "where" that is affected by social threat actions. a device that performs functions of some sort supporting the organization, commonly without end-user interaction. Where all the web applications, mail services, file servers and all that magical layer of information is generated. If someone has ever told you "the system is down," rest assured that some Servers had their Availability impacted. Servers are common targets in almost all of the attack patterns, but especially in our System Intrusion, Basic Web Application Attacks, Miscellaneous Errors and Denial of Service patterns. the folks (hopefully) doing the work at the organization. No AI chat allowed. Different types of Person will be members of different departments and will have associated permissions and access in the organization stemming from this role. At the very least they will have access to their very own User device and their own hopes and dreams for the future. Person is a common target in the Social Engineering pattern. the devices used by Persons to perform their work duties in the organizations. Usually manifested in the form of laptops, desktops, mobile phones and tablets. Common target in the System Intrusion pattern but also in the Lost and Stolen Assets pattern. People do like to take their little computers everywhere. not the concept, but the actual network computing devices that make the bits go around the world, such as routers, telephone and broadband equipment, and some of the traditional in-line network security devices, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems. Hey, Verizon is a Telecommunications company, OK?,precious diluted data in its most pure and crystalline form. Just kidding, mostly thumb drives and actual printed documents. You will see the odd full disk drive and actual physical payment cards from time to time, but those are more rare. Common in the Lost and Stolen Assets pattern. Breaking the Asset varieties down further in Figure 20 showcases Web application and Mail servers on top, as would be expected, but it is interesting to see Person - Finance trending up from last year as we see a related growth in Pretexting social actions. We will be discussing those, and more specifically BECs, in the "Social Engineering" section of this report. As a parting note, we continue to see very small numbers of incidents involving Operational Technology (OT), where the computers interface with heavy machinery and critical infrastructure, as contrasted with incidents involving Information Technology (IT), where we keep our cat pictures and internet memes. Industries like Manufacturing and Mining, Quarrying and Oil & Gas Extraction + Utilities continue to be relatively well-represented in our dataset, but reports of actual impact on OT devices are still too few for us to meaningfully write about in this report. For those keeping track, we had a 3.4% showing of OT assets in breaches that declared their impact. In summary— keep your attention level high, given the potential impact when those systems are affected, but either those numbers are very low overall, or they just don't make it to our contributors' dataset due to national security concerns. When VERIS describes Attributes, it is directly referencing the CIA triad in information security (InfoSec): Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. It's a tried-and-true method of understanding the potential impact of an incident by describing what properties of the asset were potentially affected. The next time you meet an incident responder in the wild, know that all that goes through their mind is, "Did the asset or a copy of the data get out the door" (Confidentiality), "was it changed from a known and trusted state" (Integrity) and "do we still have access to it ourselves?" (Availability). Please offer them a word of kindness and a beverage, because it is a very tortured existence. If you are feeling cold, they are cold too. One of the most interesting Attribute varieties we track year over year is the Confidentiality data varieties (Figure 21), or what kinds of data got out in a breach. Personal data represents Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from your customers, partners or employees, and it is the one that usually gets companies the most in trouble with regulators, as more and more privacy-related laws are passed around the world (although Medical data is a whole other ball of earwax). refers to limited observation and disclosure of an asset (or data). A loss of confidentiality implies that data were actually observed or disclosed to an unauthorized actor rather than endangered, at-risk or potentially exposed (the latter fall under the attribute of Possession and Control). Short definition: limited access, observation and disclosure. refers to an asset (or data) being complete and unchanged from the original or authorized state, content and function. Losses to integrity include unauthorized insertion, modification and manipulation. Short definition: complete and unchanged from original. refers to an asset (or data) being present, accessible and ready for use when needed. Losses to availability include destruction, deletion, movement, performance impact (delay or acceleration) and interruption. Short definition: accessible and ready for use when needed. Internal data and System data are usually byproducts of an extensive breach with multiple steps, as information from emails and documents are vacuumed up by threat actors. Credentials have really gained ground over the past five years, as the Use of stolen credentials became the most popular entry point for breaches. Of course, we still get specific data being beset, such as Medical, Bank account information and Payment card data. Those could be specific, targeted events or just be a part of the data that is acquired during a ransomware attack with data exfiltration. And just in case you are not tired of us moaning about ransomware, please enjoy Figure 22, where we can see another impact of the ransomware growth as the Obscuration of data became the most common availability impact variety, handily overcoming plain old Loss of data. One data variety really caught the DBIR team's attention this year: Virtual currency. We saw a fourfold increase this year in the number of breaches involving cryptocurrency from last year. That is a far cry from the days of innocence in 2020 and earlier, when we got one or two cases maximum each year. If our cartoon animal NFTs had these kinds of returns, we can assure you we would be living large and writing this report from our Lambos, not from our parents' basements. Figures 23 and 24 show the top action varieties and vectors in breaches involving virtual currency, and it is a fierce competition between Exploit vulnerabilities, Use of stolen creds and Phishing. These types of breaches fall between the actual coin networks or exchanges being breached via their applications and application programming interfaces (APIs), or phishing and pretexting activity on chat platforms (like Discord) of the coin communities, where after a simple click on a link, suddenly your wallet is not yours anymore. Having assets in virtual currency is a risky endeavor at best, even when there are no bad actors involved in rug-pulling.26 The added focus of threat actors on these types of assets doesn't make the landscape any easier. Our parting message is that unless security is taken seriously in those cases, we, in fact, are not going to make it. We certainly won't shut up about it,Not sure if we should be celebrating security incidents, but everyone loves a round number. Here's hoping being a millionaire doesn't get to our dataset's head, and they decide to join the "Great Resignation" and retire in some tropical tax haven. That's what they say, right?,OK, actually twice as likely. Huge win for anarchists and other state-abolishing ideologies, if you ask us. No, Mr. Bond, MI6 does not represent our average reader. Wouldn't you know, the moment we mention anything has not had relevance in our dataset, something new happens to remind us that change is the only constant. Best of luck for the teams responding to the 3CX supply-chain breach in late March 2023 as we close out this section. Make sure to keep copious notes so we can talk about it in a future edition of the report. Just rolls off the tongue, doesn't it?,Who here was working on the Y2K bug? Don't forget to schedule your shingles vaccine!,In everyone's defense, most of the data sharing happening here is machine-to-machine. Long gone are the days of artisanal, bespoke, VERIS-coded incidents for most of our contributors. For the extremely online folks, we apologize for the psychic damage. However, not caring for them properly could cause liabilities that would go on the right side. Just ask your organization's HR department. We know, it's a mouthful. From any country really. Our Lambos might be parked in our parent's garage, though. We're not bitter; you're bitter. That rug really tied the room together, man! If you are already a Verizon customer, we have several options to help you get the support you need. Choose your country to view contact details. Existing customers, to your business account or . These cookies are necessary for the website to function and cannot be switched off in our systems. They are usually only set in response to actions made by you which amount to a request for services, such as setting your privacy preferences, logging in or filling in forms. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not then work. These cookies do not store any personally identifiable information. These cookies allow us to count visits and traffic sources so we can measure and improve the performance of our site. They help us to know which pages are the most and least popular and see how visitors move around the site. We use both third party and first party cookies for this purpose. All information these cookies collect is aggregated and therefore anonymous. If you do not allow these cookies we will not know when you have visited our site, and will not be able to monitor its performance. These cookies enable the website to provide enhanced functionality and personalisation. They may be set by us or by third party providers whose services we have added to our pages. If you do not allow these cookies then some or all of these services may not function properly. These cookies may be set through our site by Verizon and third parties. They are used to present Verizon advertising on third party sites that you may visit. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising from Verizon. BackClear Filters,All Consent Allowed
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